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I. INTRODUCTION
As the debate on welfare reform proceeds relentlessly toward
what many hope will be a drastically altered system, critics of reform
proposals have wisely focused their attention on the competing policy
choices faced by Congress and the president (and ultimately perhaps
the states). As a result, Congress's avowed determination to limit
available funds and to abolish certain entitlements to public
assistance has prompted arguments about the merits of programs
that might compete for dwindling federal dollars. For example,
should Congress stop welfare payments to unmarried teenage
mothers? Should it cap the amount of support a family receives,
regardless of the birth of additional children? Alternatively, should
state governments make such decisions because of their greater
familiarity with the particular problems faced by their poor citizens,
or should uniform federal rules of eligibility continue to control?
Many of the most disputed calls for change explicitly target the
reproductive and familial choices made by welfare recipients, private
matters that in other contexts have been held presumptively outside
the reach of governmental authority. Such "privacy-invading" reforms
unquestionably include plans to influence personal decisions about
how many children a family should have, whether unmarried
teenagers should have children at all, and whether an individual
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should marry.1 In addition, the term could arguably cover plans to
influence single parents' decisions about working outside the home
even while children are young, plans to influence the decisions of
families with teenage mothers about living arrangements, and plans
to press for more cooperation in paternity establishment. 2 Although
critics have not hesitated to point out what is wrong with the
proposed changes in welfare, 3 one argument remains noticeably
absent from the debate:
the contention that the Constitution
prohibits reform measures invading protected individual rights or
requiring the poor to compromise liberties guaranteed to others.
This gap in the debate shows how effectively the Supreme
Court, in recent years, has communicated the message that governmental funding decisions not only belong to the legislature but also
provide an opportunity for the imposition of state value judgments
subject only to minimal judicial review. Against the background of
the evolving history of the American welfare system, this Article examines existing doctrine that makes privacy-invading welfare reforms
appear immune from successful constitutional challenges. It then
presents several reasons to question this apparent unassailability.
These reasons include constitutional equality norms and the recent
elaboration of a constitutional standard rooted in the abortion-funding
cases, the "undue-burden" test. The heightened standard of review
resulting from this analysis establishes limits on the government's
authority to manipulate protected choices in the name of welfare
reform.

1.
Examples of such proposed plans are detailed below. See notes 14, 18-19, 24-25, 29, 34
and accompanying text. I call them 'privacy-invading" because each is designed to effect a
change in a matter of personal choice-procreation or marriage-that the U.S. Supreme Court
has held protected under the right to privacy or its somewhat wider constitutional umbrella,
substantive due process. See note 69 and accompanying text.
2.
For examples of such plans, see notes 12, 16, 20, 27 and accompanying text. At first
glance, these plans, which do not seek to change decisions about procreation and marriage, may
appear to steer clear of the right to privacy. One could argue that the "privacy-invading" label
nonetheless applies to the extent that these plans implicate parental decisions about childrearing- whether to stay home or to entrust childcare to another; whether to allow an emancipated child (and her offspring) to live at home; whether, as a teenage parent, to subject one's
own childrearing choices to the second-guessing of parents and grandparents; and whether to
identify a child's father. See notes 71, 73 and accompanying text.
3.
See, for example, Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual
Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 113-14 (Routledge, 1995); Mark Robert Rank,
Welfare Does Not Cause Babies, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 3B (May 8, 1994); Martha Shirk, Teen
Pregnanciesat Centerof Welfare Debate; Young Mothers Here Scoff at GOP Plan, St. Louis PostDispatch 1A (Feb. 5, 1995); Lucie E. White, On the "Consensus"to End Welfare: Where Are the
Women's Voices?, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 843, 844-45 (1994).
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II. WELFARE PRESENT, FUTURE, AND PAST

President Clinton's 1992 campaign promises included a commitment "to end welfare as we know it."4 This promise had only begun to take shape in the administration-backed 'Work and
Responsibility Act of 1994," 5 however, when Republicans gained a
majority in Congress6 and made welfare reform their own legislative
priority. They did so as one step in their general effort to reduce
federal spending (in the expressed hope of balancing the budget) and
also as a means of staking out moral high ground on a variety of family issues that had become contentious in recent years, particularly
during congressional and presidential election campaigns. 7 Indeed,
November 1996 now looms sufficiently near that the political battle to
claim ownership of welfare reform has reached a fever pitch, with
almost daily announcements of new developments.8 At the same time,
4.

See, for example, Mickey Kaus, Welfare Waffle: What's That Plan Again, Bill?, New

Republic 10 (Oct. 12, 1992) (describing campaign television ads promising "to end welfare as we
know it"D.
5.
H.R. 4605, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 21, 1994), in 140 Cong. Rec. H4753-54 (June 21,
1994). One may question, of course, whether the enactment of this bill would have brought
about the transformation President Clinton had promised, because the emphasis on work
outside the home parrots the theme already put in place by the Family Support Act of 1988, 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-87 (1988 ed. & Supp. V). See Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and
Their Children, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 817, 819 (1994) (asserting that the Family Support Act shows
that society expects everyone to work). Indeed, federal work requirements for welfare recipients
were enacted even earlier, in 1981, but without the funding necessary for success. See Sylvia A.
Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservationof Patriarchy,131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1249, 127479 (1983).
6.
See R.W. Apple, Jr., The 1994 Elections: News Analysis, N.Y. Times Al (Nov. 9, 1994);
David E. Rosenbaum, Right Stuff. G.O.P. Unleashes Its New Weapon: Winning Candidates,
N.Y. Times § 4 at 4 (Nov. 13, 1994).
7.
Prominent examples in recent campaigns include then Vice-President Quayle's
"Murphy Brown" speech, condemning this fictional television character for providing a role
model for single motherhood, see Eleanor Clift, with Clara Bingham, The Murphy Brown Policy,
Newsweek 46 (June 1, 1992), President Bush's campaign for "family values," see Curtis Wilkie,
Mandate ProvidesIncentive to Act, Boston Globe, National/Foreign, at 1, 26 (Nov. 4, 1992), and
Patrick Buchanan's call to arms in America's "culture war" at the 1992 Republican National
Convention, see Robert Brustein, Arts Wars II: The Empire Strikes Back, New Republic 38 (Oct.
12, 1992). Although some analysts attributed President Clinton's success in the 1992 election to
these Republican policy positions, the "family values" theme has persisted, with 1994's
victorious Republicans incorporating some "family values" points in their "Contract With
America," the ultra-conservative Christian Coalition developing its own "Contract with the
American Family," and President Clinton then announcing his own "American Family Values
Agenda," which includes campaigns against teenage pregnancy and smoking. See Alison
Mitchell, On Issue of Family Values, Clinton Unveils an Agenda of His Own, N.Y. Times § 1 at 6
(July 29, 1995). See also Elizabeth Kolbert, Whose Family Values Are They, Anyway?, N.Y.
Times § 4 at 1 (Aug. 6, 1995) (observing how Republican presidential hopefuls tout "family
values" despite their own divorces).
8.
See, for example, Alison Mitchell, Clinton and Dole PresentProgramsto Alter Welfare,
N.Y. Times Al (Aug. 1, 1995) (describing their speeches to governors); John Ashcroft, A Plan to
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a number of states have seized the issue, formulating their own solutions to the welfare problem. In some cases, states have secured
waivers from federal requirements in order to adopt welfare innovations, while legislators and activists in other states have advanced no
further than to float new strategies before the court of public opinion.
To provide some representative illustrations: The House of
Representatives passed the "Personal Responsibility Act of 1995,"
purported to be "an Act to restore the American family, reduce illegitimacy, control welfare spending and reduce welfare dependence."lo
Although the act would transfer some significant responsibilities for
public aid from the federal government to the states by allocating
block grants for states to distribute according to their own eligibility
rules for recipients," it includes national work requirements 12 and a
five-year limit on assistance," as well as a prohibition on support for
out-of-wedlock births to minors and a prohibition on additional cash
assistance for children born to families already receiving welfare," a
measure often described as a "family cap." The Senate's 'Work
Opportunity Act of 1995,"'15 although similar to the House bill in its
approach to work requirements 16 and time limits on assistance, 1'
would allow even more flexibility for experimentation with block
grants by remitting to the states whether or not to impose a family
cap' 8 or to deny assistance to teenage parents,'9 while mandating that
states providing support for such teens require them to live in adultsupervised settings and attend school. 2°

End Welfare Dependency, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 3E (July 2, 1995) (commentary by a U.S.
Senator).
9.
H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (version passed by the House of Representatives on
March 24, 1995).
10. Id.
11.
Id. § 101.
12.
Id. (replacement for § 404 of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 271, 49 Stat. 620
(1935), codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1988 ed. & Supp. V)).
13.
Id. (replacement for § 405 of the Social Security Act).
14. Id.
15. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (version passed by the Senate on Sept. 19, 1995).
16. Id. § 101 (replacement for § 404 of the Social Security Act). The work requirement is
coupled with the provision of childcare. Id. (replacement for § 419 of the Social Security Act).
17.
Id. (replacement for § 405 of the Social Security Act).
18. Id. § 101 (replacement for § 406 of the Social Security Act).
19. Id.
20. Id. See, for example, Robert Pear, Clinton and Dole Bidding to Break Welfare
Impasse, N.Y. Times § 1 at 1 (July 30, 1995) (reporting that Dole is considering requirements
that teen mothers live at home and attend school as well as a mandate that states deny benefits
to teen mothers).
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Emerging in the midst of government-closing conflicts about
the federal budget, 21 the "Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act of 1995" reconciles these two bills.22 Consistent with
both proposals, it replaces the federal entitlements of Aid to Families
23
with Dependent Children ("AFDC") with block grants to the states.
Its approach to aid for teenage parents resembles that in the Senate
bill,24 but its family cap provision splits the difference between the

two proposals by prohibiting states from increasing aid to welfare
families upon the birth of additional children, while allowing a state
to opt out of this restriction only if the state enacts a law to this
effect. 25 Despite his announced support for the Senate bill, the
conference report has been vetoed by President Clinton,26 whose own
pitch professes commitment to work incentives, including childcare so
meantime,
parents can work, and to protecting children.27 In the
28
forward.
press
to
vowed
have
advocates of federal reform
Some state plans, developed even before the current national
frenzy, have already been implemented, serving not only as a gauge of
local effectiveness but also as a laboratory for measures that might be
adopted nationwide. Accordingly, Wisconsin's "bridefare" tests financial incentives designed to encourage welfare mothers to marry. 29 Its
approach to increasing paternity establishments focuses attention on

21. See, for example, Business Digest, N.Y. Times § 1 at 39 (Dec. 23, 1995) (reporting the
continuation of the budget stalemate between the president and congressional leaders,
promising to keep federal offices closed into 1996).
22. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995, Conference Report on H.R.
4, in 141 Cong. Rec. H15317 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995). See id. at H15533 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995)
(adopted by the House); id. at S19145 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (adopted by the Senate).
23. 141 Cong. Rec. at H15319-28 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (H.R. 4 § 103).
24. Id. at H15323 (H.R. 4 § 103) (replacement for § 408 of the Social Security Act). See
141 Cong. Rec. at H15401-02 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (comparison of the House, Senate, and
Conference versions).
25. Id. at H15323 (H.R. 4 § 103) (replacement for § 408 of the Social Security Act). See
141 Cong. Rec. at H15402 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (comparison of the House, Senate, and
conference versions).
26. PresidentialVeto Message: Welfare-to-Work Provisions Cited in Veto of Overhaul, 54
Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 103 (Jan. 13, 1996).
27. Id. White House Briefing: Remarks by PresidentBill Clinton to Natl. GovernorsAssoc.
Meeting, Fed. News Service (July 31, 1995); Excerpts from News Conference with President
Clinton, N.Y. Times B8 (April 19, 1995); David E. Resenbaum, Welfare in Transition: The
Background; Clinton in Awkward Role in the Debate on Welfare Reform, N.Y. Times B11 (Sept.
21, 1995).
28. See Pamela H. Prah, Welfare Reform: Clinton Vetoes Welfare Package; Lawmakers
Look to 1996 to Try Again, Daily Labor Report 7 (Jan. 11, 1996).
29. See Julie Kosterlitz, The MarriagePenalty, 24 Natl. J. 1454 (June 20, 1992) (reporting
the debate about whether Wisconsin's "bridefare" rewards marriage or removes financial
disincentives for marrying).
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efforts to identify fathers. 30 New Jersey's Family Development
Program, a family cap instituted in 1992,31 provides data about
whether a ceiling on welfare will deter the birth of additional children
among the poor (it hasn't32), while Congress considers analogous plans
for the entire country.33 Other state proposals, such as financial rewards for poor women using Norplant, 34 although excoriated in the
media, 35 remain useful talking points in surveying the expansive
landscape of welfare reform.
Beneath the wide array of proposed changes lie a few core
criticisms of "welfare as we know it." Existing welfare rules, we are
told, perpetuate dependency. 36 Rather than simply insuring subsistence for poor children, the present system supposedly provides financial incentives for recipients to produce children in order to receive
subsidies and avoid work. 37 It makes fatherless families financially
30.

See Christa Andrews, State Intervention into the Lives of Single Mothers and Their

Children: Toward a Resolution of MaternalAutonomy and Children'sNeeds, 8 Law & Ineq. J.
567, 602-04 (1990) (explaining and critiquing Wisconsin's approach).
31. See C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995) (unsuccessfully challenging New
Jersey's family cap).
32. Barbara Vobejda, N.J. Welfare 'Cap' Has No Effect on Births, Study Finds,
Washington Post A3 (June 21, 1995) (reporting the results of a Rutgers University study of New
Jersey's law); Law Fails to Curb Births to Welfare Mothers, Baltimore Sun 6F (July 2, 1995)
(same). See also Mark R. Rank, Fertility Among Women on Welfare: Incidence and
Determinants,54 Am. Soc. Rev. 296 (1989) (finding that the fertility rate of welfare recipients is
lower than that of women in the general population and that the longer a woman receives
welfare, the less likely she is to give birth). But see Iver Peterson, Welfare in Transition:New
Jersey; The G.O.P.'s "FamilyCap" Has a Democratic History, N.Y. Times B10 (Sept. 21, 1995)
(reporting statistics showing a drop in the birth rate of 11.4%, but an increase in abortions).
33. See Kathleen Best, "Family Cap" Yesterday's Crazy Idea on Curbing Welfare Is
Today's Law, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 4B (Sept. 17, 1995) (discussing Illinois's family cap);
Robert Pear, Dole Reversal; A Welfare Revolution Hits Home, But Quietly, N.Y. Times § 4 at 1
(Aug. 13, 1995) (discussing state welfare experiments).
The bill initially approved by the House includes, in addition to a mandatory family cap, a
prohibition on assistance for families that refuse to cooperate in establishing paternity, H.R. 4 §
101 (cited in note 9) (replacement for § 405 of the Social Security Act), as well as measures to
increase paternity establishment, such as authorization for states to require welfare recipients
and their children to undergo genetic testing, id. § 931.
34. See Tamar Lewin, A Plan to Pay Welfare Mothers for Birth Control, N.Y. Times § 1 at
9 (Feb. 9, 1991).
35. See, for example, Charlotte Allen, Norplant-Birth Control or Coercion?, Wall St. J.
A10 (Sept. 13, 1991); American Medical Association, Boardof Trustees Report: Requirements or
Incentives by Government for the Use of Long-Acting Contraceptives, 267 J. A.M.A. 1818 (1992);
Stephanie Denmark, Birth-ControlTyranny, N.Y. Times § 1 at 3 (Oct. 19, 1991).
36. See generally, for example, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
A Community of Self Reliance: The New Consensus on Family and Welfare (1987); Mary Jo
Bane and David T. Ellwood, Welfare Realities: From Rhetoric to Reform 67-123 (Harvard U.,
1994).
37. Gary L. Bauer, Family Cap: Incentive for Welfare Moms, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 17D
(Nov. 17, 1995); Charles A. Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 at 154-
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viable, thus arguably stunting the next generation's emotional development, fostering irresponsible and immoral sexual activity, and
imposing crushing burdens on government that other families them38
selves must bear.
How did we arrive at this mess?
Welfare historians have chronicled the development of the
modern "welfare state" from its ancestry in the Elizabethan Poor
Laws and its birth during the New Deal.3 9

According to Linda

Gordon, contemporary welfare programs-notably AFDC-evolved
from a feminist project honoring mothering and emphasizing
casework.40 During the Progressive Era, elite and middle-class
women, "maternalists," became activists for 'Mothers' Pensions" to
provide support for poor women who conformed to the gender roles of
respectable married women. 41 With such pensions, even unmarried
mothers could afford to imitate the behavior of their more comfortable
counterparts, who stayed at home with their children and depended
Yet ultimately
upon their husbands for a "family wage."42

66 (Basic Books, 1984). See, for example, Nancy Gibbs, The Vicious Cycle, Time 24, 28 (June 20,
1994); Note, Dethroning the Welfare Queen: The Rhetoric of Reform, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 2013,
2019-20 (1994).
38. See, for example, Law, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1271 (cited in note 5) (stating that critics
of welfare claim it has undermined family stability); Minow, 26 Conn. L. Rev. at 826 (cited in
note 5) (describing the "equity argument," which asks why welfare mothers should not work if
others must do so in order to support families). But compare Mark R. Rank and Li-Chen Cheng,
Welfare Across Generations: How Important Are the Ties That Bind?, 57 J. Marriage & Fam.
673, 678, 681-82 (1995) (finding that three quarters of welfare recipients did not grow up in
welfare families, but that children in welfare families are more likely to become welfare
recipients as a result of poverty, not because of welfare per se).
39. See, for example, Bane and Ellwood, Welfare Realities at 1-27 (cited in note 36)
(discussing welfare's development from the early 1960s through the present); Linda Gordon,
Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935 (Free Press,
1994); Law, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1252-54 (cited in note 5); Jacobus tenBroek, California'sDual
System of Family Law: Its Origin,Development and Present Status, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 257 (1964)
(Part I); 16 Stan. L. Rev. 900 (1964) (Part II); 17 Stan. L. Rev. 614 (1965) (Part III).
40. See Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled at 38 (cited in note 39). Gordon describes the
casework approach in the following way:
[Tihis technique required in-depth investigation of a client's background, circumstances,
and attitudes. Individualization was in fact the essence of casework: Its guiding principle was "to treat unequal things unequally." The very premise of casework was antibureaucratic, in the pure sense of bureaucracy, since it insisted on the worker's discretion. The caseworker was emphatic that money alone was not enough....
Casework was nevertheless scientific in an important sense. It derived from the
"scientific charity" movement, which equated casework with the scientific method itself.
In the nineteenth century charity workers identified causes of poverty which they then
counted.
Id. at 175 (footnotes omitted).
41. See id. at 55.
42. See id.; Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in HistoricalPerspective, 26 Conn. L. Rev.
879, 879 (1994); White, 26 Conn. L. Rev. at 852 (cited in note 3).
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governmental support for children of single mothers became the
disfavored and stigmatized stepchild of an approach in which social
insurance (reflecting male notions of poverty and need) emerged as
the only respectable vision of public assistance. 43 That poor widows
with children could always justify departures from this vision simply
brightens the line that Gordon traces between "deserving" and
"undeserving" recipients of public aid.44 One sees this line today in
the pervasive requirements of means- and morals-testing for welfare
eligibility. 45 One sees it as well in the rhetoric of modern welfare
critics, particularly those who insist that public assistance encourages
single mothers to bear child after child in order to avoid the hard
4s
work of self-sufficiency.
Given its roots in casework, welfare historically has served not
only as a humanitarian response to poverty but also as a tool promising "behavior modification" of its recipients. 47 The particular social
43. See Gordon, PitiedBut Not Entitled at 270-73 (cited in note 39); Joel F. Handler, Two
Years and You're Out, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 857, 858-59 (1994). From 1935 to 1968, welfare was not
a legal entitlement, but a gratuity that states had discretion to provide to those who met certain
requirements. Law, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1261 (cited in note 5).
44. See Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled at 27 (cited in note 39) (stating that welfare
strategists initially focused on poor widows as epitomizing the "deserving poor"); id. at 281
(stating that the later decline in young widowhood and the rise in the number of the divorced
and unmarried mothers stigmatized poor single mothers). See also Peter B. Edelman, Toward a
Comprehensive Anti-Poverty Strategy: Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 Georegetown L. J.
1697, 1703-09 (1993) (tracing the "deserving poor" through American history); Minow, 26 Conn.
L. Rev. at 830-31 (cited in note 5) (noting that widows receiving Social Security are not expected
to work, unlike welfare mothers). See generally Herbert A. Gans, The War Against the Poor:
The Underclassand Antipoverty Policy (Basic Books, 1995) (criticizing "undeserving" and other
pejorative labels applied to the poor).
At one time, women with children, like the aged, blind, and disabled, were treated as
"deserving" because they were presumed unemployable, based on their traditional
"unsuitability" for wage labor and their responsibility for child care. Law, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. at
1253 (cited in note 5).
45. Means-testing refers to eligibility based on a specified level of financial need. See
Murray, Losing Ground at 184-85 (cited in note 37) (criticizing this practice). Morals-testing
refers to eligibility requirements conditioned on moral behavior. See, for example, Gordon,
PitiedBut Not Entitled at 282 (cited in note 39) (discussing the "suitable home" requirement for
AFDC); Law, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1325 (cited in note 5) (observing that, unlike the blind and
disabled, poor women must comply with sexual and social norms). The program that became
AFDC "was unique among all welfare programs in its subjection of applicants to a morals test."
Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled at 298 (cited in note 39). Obviously, many of the current
welfare reform proposals would impose new morals-testing requirements.
46. See, for example, William J. Bennett, The Best Welfare Reform: End It, Washington
Post A19 (March 30, 1994) ('Welfare subsidizes and sustains illegitimacy"). See also Bane and
Ellwood, Welfare Realities at 68-74 (cited in note 36) (providing a rational-choice model for
understanding welfare dependency).
47. After long using this phrase to describe programs conditioning the receipt of welfare
benefits on specific changes in behavior (for example, employment, marriage, or discontinued
reproduction), I discovered that I was not alone. See Julie Kosterlitz, BehaviorModification, 24
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goals of this "reward system" have varied over the years, including
Americanizing poor immigrants, 48 encouraging the maintenance of 49a
"suitable home" free from the corruption of immoral sexual behavior,
promoting self-sufficiency, 50 or-as in recent headline-grabbing proposals-limiting family size, encouraging marriage, deterring illegitimate births, and increasing the involvement of fathers in the lives
of their children. 51 Today, such "morals-testing" coupled with the
practice of "means-testing52 for eligibility often pose dilemmas for
those seeking to qualify as both "properly behaved" and needy. For
example, a mother's employment may demonstrate the appropriate
striving for self-support while simultaneously disqualifying her as
insufficiently destitute.53 On the other hand, remaining at home to
care for her children may create the perception of a lazy "welfare
queen," requiring reformation by state financial incentives.M Lost in
the struggle to identify the most efficient and worthy model of behavior are the personal choices that the individuals in question would
make if left to act according to their own preferences. Lost as well are

Natl. J. 271 (Feb. 1, 1992); Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification
Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 Yale L. J. 719 (1992). The analogy to psychologists' efforts to
"condition" rats and pigeons through "reinforcement" remains irresistible. See, for example, B.
F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior 65-66 (Macmillan, 1953).
Douglas Besharov of the American Enterprise Institute has referred to this approach as the
"new paternalism." Innovations, New Directions, and New Convergences in Poverty Alleviation,
Hearings before the House Select Committee on Hunger, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, 39 (1992)
(statement of Douglas J. Besharov).
48. See Gordon, PitiedBut Not Entitled at 46 (cited in note 39).
49. See id. at 298. Compare King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968) (invalidating
Alabama's "substitute father" regulation, designed to discourage immorality and illegitimacy,
that denied AFDC to children whose mother cohabited with a man, regardless of his duty to
support them).
50. Bane and Ellwood, Welfare Realities at 124-42 (cited in note 36).
51. Hearings at 49-51 (cited in note 47) (chart cataloguing many of the measures). The
welfare reform bill passed by the House, H.R. 4 (cited in note 9), provides incentives for states to
reduce the illegitimacy rate and requires strict state laws for paternity establishment. Compare
Fineman, The Neutered Mother at 185-86 (cited in note 3) (criticizing the latter approach).
52. See note 45. Such requirements ultimately resulted in the replacement of the
individualized casework approach, see note 40, with the unwieldy bureaucracy that has become
a hallmark of the modern welfare system. See Bane and Ellwood, Welfare Realities at 1-27
(cited in note 36).
53. See, for example, Bane and Ellwood, Welfare Realities at 6-7 (cited in note 36)
(explaining that the system often "encourages passivity" by focusing recipients' efforts on
retaining eligibility instead of attaining self-sufficiency). See also Murray, Losing Ground at
162-64 (cited in note 37) (arguing that work incentives for some induce others not to work).
Even before federal law embraced the expectation that everyone should work, as reflected in the
Family Support Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-87, see note 5, many local rules imposed explicit
wagework requirements on mothers. Law, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1257-58 (cited in note 5).
Compare H.R. 4, notes 9, 12, 15, 16 and accompanying text (describing the work requirements
in the House and Senate bills).
54. See generally Minow, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 817 (cited in note 5).
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the interests of poor children, whom even the earliest welfare efforts
sought to protect.r 5
Thus, the distinction between the deserving and undeserving
poor conveys more than one meaning. It not only refers to the wellentrenched line separating beneficiaries of social insurance programs
from welfare recipients,56 but it also describes differences among
welfare recipients who meet some prescribed behavioral norm versus
those who do not.
Still another classification parallels these distinctions. Thirty
years ago, in his important critique of "California's dual system of
family law,"57 Jacobus tenBroek identified two distinct bodies of family law in operation in that state in the 1960s: one for families "in
comfortable circumstances" and another for poor families. 58 Under
this divided regime, vastly different legal rules govern family matters,
such as support obligations between spouses and the parent-child
relation, for the two groups. Professor tenBroek demonstrated this
duality by pointing out the strings the state attaches to public
assistance:
the family law of the poor derives its particular content and special nature
from the central concept of the poor law system: public provision for the care
and support of the poor. He who pays the bill can attach conditions, related or
unrelated to the purpose of the grant, and almost always does.59

55. See Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled at 15-35 (cited in note 39). See also King, 392
U.S. at 322-27 (finding that Congress has determined that immorality and illegitimacy should
be addressed through rehabilitation, since the protection of dependent children is the
paramount goal of AFDC).
56. See note 44. Yet another reflection of the distinction emerges from the difference in
status between assistance programs that were entirely federal, such as OAI, and those based on
federal grants to the states, leaving more room for state control, such as AFDC. See Gordon,
Pitied But Not Entitled at 274, 293 (cited in note 39). See also Law, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1326
(cited in note 5) ("Since 1974, another factor in the comparatively disfavored status of AFDC
recipients has been the fact that the federal government takes primary responsibility for
financing and administering the SSI program for the aged, blind, and disabled but has not taken
primary resplnsibility for AFDC" (footnote omitted)). This stratification will likely become even
more pronounced under a block-grant system like those approved by the House and Senate. See
notes 11, 18-20, 23 and accompanying text.
57. tenBroek, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 257; 16 Stan. L. Rev. 900; 17 Stan. L. Rev. 614 (cited in
note 39).
58. tenBroek, 16 Stan. L. Rev. at 978 (cited in note 39) (tracing the former primarily to
common-law developments while attributing the latter to legislative action modeled on the
Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601).
59. tenBroek, 17 Stan. L. Rev. at 676 (cited in note 39). Congress also has used this
"carrot and stick" approach to impose required legal actions as conditions on states receiving
federal funds. Prominent examples appear in the Family Support Act of 1988. See, for
example, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5) (requiring states to have procedures for establishing paternity
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By contrast, the common-law doctrine of family privacy shields families that receive no financial aid, leaving to each family the resolution
of its own controversies and restraining the state from imposing a
single vision of appropriate family conduct. 60 For tenBroek, the answer to the "dual system" probably lay in the Constitution.
Concluding his critique on a note of optimism, he cited the movement
toward equality reflected in some landmark constitutional decisions of
the day, including Brown v. Board of Education.6 1 In these decisions
he saw the promise of an eventually unified family law, applicable to
comfortable and poor alike.62 Subsequent constitutional decisions
show how far tenBroek's prediction missed the mark, however.

anytime prior to a child's 18th birthday), and the House's welfare reform legislation, H.R. 4 §
101 (cited in note 9) (replacement for § 405 of the Social Security Act) (prohibiting a state's use
of block grants for assistance for out-of-wedlock births to minors). See generally Albert J.
Rosenthal, ConditionalFederal Spending and the Constitution, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1103 (1987).
60. The classic exemplars, leaving families the responsibility of resolving internal disputes
in the manner that suits the particular family best, include McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336,
341, 157 Neb. 226 (1953) (holding that a wife cannot enforce a husband's duty of support unless
the couple separates); Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885, 888, 268 Ala. 475 (1958) (holding that
the court has no jurisdiction to resolve a parental dispute concerning a child's schooling absent a
custody question); Roe v. Doe, 272 N.E.2d 567, 569, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1971) (holding that the
court has no authority to order a father to support a disobedient, unemancipated child). Of
course, although it fosters pluralism, the "family privacy" doctrine has provoked considerable
criticism, particularly from feminists. See, for example, Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State
Intervention in the Family, 18 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 835, 837 (1985) (describing the debate about
intervention and nonintervention as incoherent, given the state's involvement in the "formation
and functioning of families); Nadine Taub and Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspectiveson Women's
Subordination and the Role of Law, in David Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law: A Progressive
Critique 117 (Pantheon, 1982) (arguing that privacy perpetuates male domination and sex
discrimination); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 973 (1991)
(arguing that nonintervention permits family violence).
61. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. See tenBroek, 17 Stan. L. Rev. at 678 (cited in note 39) ("In this historic, dual system
of family laws, reembodied in California's present-day welfare programs, two new elements are
beginning to emerge: Welfare purposes beyond relieving the distress of poverty are influencing
the character of the law of the poor; the poor are beginning to receive the safeguards and
protections of the Constitution").
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III. THE DUAL SYSTEM CONSTITUTIONALIZED: THE LEGACY OF THE
ABORTION-FUNDING CASES
A. ConstitutionalPrivacy: Reproductive Choice and Family
Autonomy
Whether one cites as the cornerstone case Prince v.
Massachusetts,63 Skinner v. Oklahoma,64 Loving v. Virginia,65 or
Griswold v. Connecticut,66 modern constitutional jurisprudence has
unquestionably carved out an enclave of familial decisions, relationships, and activities protected from state intrusion. True, the resulting right to privacy raises numerous points of contention; critics' lists
of such points might include questions about where in the
Constitution the right resides, whether the matters protected by the
right legitimately can be described as private, why the right does not
embrace some matters that closely resemble those it does protect, and
what meaningful limits can be fashioned for a concept so amorphous.67
Though the Supreme Court's answers do not put any of these
questions to rest, it has developed some now well-established
responses.
After attempting to rely on the "penumbras" of the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution,68 a
majority of the Court found a less evanescent source for the right to
privacy in the liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due

63. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In upholding a child-labor restriction, the Court recognized a
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." Id. at 166. Prince followed two
earlier cases containing language supportive of parental autonomy in childrearing, despite
holdings resting more squarely on the economic substantive due process rights of schools and
teachers. See Pierce u. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer u. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923).
64. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that a statute calling for compulsory sterilization of some
felons, but not others, violates equal protection). The Court observed that procreation is "one of
the basic civil rights of man." Id. at 541.
65. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that an antimiscegenation law violates equal protection and
due process). The Court recognized freedom of choice in marriage as a fundamental right. Id.
at 12.
66. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court invalidated Connecticut's ban on the use of contraceptives, even by married couples, because it invaded the constitutional right to privacy found in
the penumbras of various parts of the Bill of Rights. See id. at 482-85.
67. See, for example, Robert H. Bark, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 7-11 (1971) (criticizing Griswold); Comments on the Griswold Case, 64
Mich. L. Rev. 197 (1965) (symposioum with contributions by Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Thomas I.
Emerson, Paul G. Kauper, Robert B. McKay, and Arthur E. Sutherland).
68. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-85.
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Process Clause. 69 Although in doing so the Court has concededly
given "privacy" an elastic or even double meaning,70 it has invoked the
right to protect individual decisions concerning educating and rearing
73
72
one's children, 71 choosing a spouse and family living arrangements,
using and having access to contraceptives, 74 and terminating or
continuing a pregnancy.7 5 Although each of these matters has some
69. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Roe prompted criticism about the Court's
resurrection of "substantive due process," see, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due
Processby Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. Ct. Rev. 159, 184-85, a phrase the
Justices more forthrightly embraced a term later, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a city ordinance prohibiting an extended family
from living together as a violation of substantive due process).
70. See, for example, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977):
The cases sometimes characterized as protecting "privacy" have in fact involved at
least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions.
Id. (citations omitted).
The first privacy interest arguably traces back to Warren and Brandeis's proposal for
reforming the law of torts to protect individual "thoughts, emotions and sensations." Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 206 (1890). See, for
example, Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal.
L. Rev. 383 (1960); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren
and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 291 (1983). Griswold's emphasis on shielding
the marital bedroom from police searches (rather than on protecting the availability of contraceptives), see 381 U.S. at 485-86, suggests the Court was protecting "nondisclosure" or
"seclusion" privacy in that case.
The second privacy interest, really a form of liberty or autonomy, has emerged as the more
far-reaching and controversial of the two. See, for example, PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 674 (1992), discussed at notes 314-33 and accompanying
text. See also David J. Garrow, Liberty & Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of
Roe v. Wade (Macmillan, 1994) (providing an historian's account).
71. See, for example, Meyer, 262 U.S. 390 (protecting teaching German to
schooolchildren); Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (protecting private schooling); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (requiring exemption of Anish children from compulsory school attendance
beyond the eighth grade). See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that the
termination of parental rights for neglect based on a mere preponderance of the evidence
violates due process); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that presuming an
unmarried father's unfitness to rear children violates due process and that denying him a
hearing on fitness, accorded to all other parents, violates equal protection).
72. See, for example, Loving, 388 U.S. at 1 (holding a state's antimiscegenation law
unconstitutional); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that state restrictions on
marrying for persons with outstanding support obligations violates equal protection); Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding restrictions on inmate marriages unconstitutional).
73. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505 (declaring an ordinance barring a grandmother from residing
with her two grandchildren unconstitutional).
74. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (protecting the use of contraception by married couples);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (protecting access to contraceptives for unmarried
individuals). See also Carey v. PopulationServs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (overturning
restrictions on access by minors).
75. Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (establishing a fundamental right to abortion protected by the
compelling-state-interest test). See also Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (joint opinion) (ruling that the
fundamental right to abortion is protected by the undue-burden test). The Justices have made
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tie to intimate association, bodily integrity, self-definition, or all of the
above, the Court has made clear that such criteria may be necessary
but not sufficient for privacy status. Accordingly, privacy does not
encompass consensual homosexual intimacy,76 and despite finding
some constitutional support for a right to refuse life-saving medical
treatment, the Court has failed to utter the word "privacy" in addressing that issue. 77 Although the standard itself leaves substantial room
for the Justices to disagree about its contours, the opinions have consistently stated that history and tradition define the boundaries of
privacy,71 preventing it from becoming a cover for the unprincipled
79
and constitutionally unwarranted imposition of judicial values.
clear that the right protected is one of choice: whether to terminate or continue the pregnancy.
See id. at 2811 (joint opinion) ("If indeed the woman's interest in deciding whether to bear and
beget a child had not been recognized as in Roe, the State might as readily restrict a woman's
right to choose to carry a pregnancy to term as to terminate it, to further asserted state
interests in population control, or eugenics, for example'). See also Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 453
(characterizing the protected right as the "decision whether to bear or beget a child').
76. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (explicitly refusing to apply the
privacy doctrine in an unsuccessful challenge to Georgia's criminal ban on consensual sodomy).
See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 187,
225-27 (showing that the interests at stake in Bowers are the same as those at stake in the
abortion and contraception cases).
77. See Cruzan v. Director,Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The majority, while
not mentioning the right to privacy, was willing to assume for purposes of that case that "the
United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Id. at 279. The assumed right, however, did not
trump the state's interest in insisting on clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent
patient's refusal of treatment. The '"right to die" raised in such cases implicates the same
individual interests in self-determination, physical integrity, and family autonomy recognized
in the abortion and contraception cases (a conclusion that does not require equating the state's
interests in these different contexts). See generally Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An
Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia,and Individual Freedom (Arthur A. Knopf, 1993).
78. See, for example, Roe, 410 U.S. at 140 (relying on history in recognizing the right to
abortion); Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion) ("Our decisions establish that the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'). See also Michael H. v. GeraldD., 491 U.S.
110, 127 n.6 (1989) (reflecting the Justices' disagreement about how to characterize asserted
rights to determine whether they are "traditional"); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (citing the "ancient
roots" of the proscription against sodomy). Compare Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (finding a right to refuse medical treatment "deeply rooted in this Nation's
traditions'), with id. at 294-95 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing the traditional criminalization of
suicide). Compare by analogy Katharine T. Barlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress
in Feminist Legal Thought, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 303 (showing the use of tradition in constitutional
jurisprudence and arguing that it is an important component of progress); David L. Faigman,
Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally,45 Hastings L. J. 753, 781-83 (1994) (discussing
the debate about "generality" in conceptualizing rights).
79. But see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 521 (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that no constitutional
provision protects "privacy" and that the Court cannot substitute its views for the legislature's);
Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (contending that the Court has imposed its own
views in place of the legislature's).
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The doctrinal significance of privacy protection for a particular
choice, activity, or relationship lies in the standard of review that it
triggers. Although the Griswold majority failed to discuss any standard of review in its recognition of privacy, thus implying that this
right is absolutely protected from all state intrusions,"° subsequent
cases have employed a balancing approach. Because the Court has
classified privacy as a "fundamental" constitutional right, state action
interfering with the right must meet the most demanding level of
judicial review in order to survive a challenge: the state action must
serve a compelling state interest and must be narrowly tailored to
advance that end. Thus, for fundamental rights, the balance of individual and state interests favors the individual.
The majority's analysis in Roe provides an instructive example
of the way the formulas8 usually works. As a result of a series of
physical and familial "detriments" that unwanted pregnancy can impose on a woman and her family, the fundamental right to privacy
includes the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy. 2 Applying
strict judicial scrutiny to Texas's criminal prohibition of all abortions
except those necessary to save the life of the mother yields Roe's familiar trimester timetable, which disallows virtually all state
interference during the first trimester when the state lacks any
compelling countervailing interest;83 permits regulations reasonably
designed to further the State's interest in maternal health once this
interest reaches its "compelling point" after the first trimester;8 4 and
85
allows bans on all but therapeutic abortions upon fetal viability,
when the state's interest in protecting potential life reaches its
80. The Griswold majority never inquired about the state's interests in banning birth
control although, in condemning the law as unnecessarily broad, it implied that the unidentified
state interests could be served by a more narrowly drawn measure. 381 U.S. at 485.
81. See Hans A. Linde, Who Must Know What, When, and How: The Systemic Incoherence
of "Interest"Scrutiny, in Stephen E. Gottlieb, ed., Public Values in ConstitutionalLaw 219, 22022 (U. Mich., 1993) (discussing "the formulas" for judicial review); Robert F. Nagel, The
Formulaic Constitution, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 165 (1985); Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing:
The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in ConstitutionalLaw, 45 Hastings L. J. 711, 735 n.62 (1994)
("the Constitution has taken on a 'formulaic' cast") (citing Robert F. Nagel, Constitutional
Cultures: The Mentality and Consequences of JudicialReview 121-22 (U. Cal., 1989)). But see
Carl E. Schneider, State Interest Analysis in FourteenthAmendment "Privacy"Law: An Essay
on the Constitutionalizationof Social Issues, 51 Law & Contemp. Probs. 79, 82-96 (1988)
(describing the uncertainties of the present standard in substantive due process cases, despite
the formulaic recitations).
82. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
83. Id. at 163, 164.
84. Id. at 163. The Court relied on the increasing danger of abortion as pregnancy progresses.
85. See id. at 163-65. The Court thus ruled that the Constitution always protects from
state interference abortions necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life or health.
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"compelling point. ''86
Roe and its successors stand out as
extraordinary because they concede that some state interests can
qualify as compelling, instead of demonstrating the usual fatality of
strict scrutiny. 87 Nonetheless, these cases illustrate the power of this
level of judicial review. After all, the outcome of Roe was the
invalidation of every abortion prohibition in the United States,
including those in jurisdictions that had recently modernized and
liberalized their laws.88
B. State Value Judgments and BehaviorModification: The Priceof
PublicSupport
This strict-scrutiny standard, however, does not apply when
the state seeks to advance its interests and limit individual privacy
rights through the allocation of public funds. The Court has articulated this doctrine most clearly and forcefully in the abortion-funding
cases. In 1977, in Maher v. Roe, 89 the Court held that, despite the
super-protected status of the abortion choice, a state's refusal to subsidize elective abortions for indigent women need only pass the easy
rational-basis test, even when the state provides financial assistance
for poor women who choose continued pregnancy and childbirth. 90 In

86. The Court sought to explain its choice of viability on both 'logical and biological"
grounds: "the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's
womb." Id. at 163.
Although the three Justices in Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, thought the special character of
abortion and the abiding nature of the state's interest in the fetus justified replacing strict
scrutiny with an undue-burden test, id. at 2819-21, they reaffirmed that the abortion choice
belongs within the fundamental right to privacy. They also adhered to viability as the point
when the state's asserted interest becomes sufficiently compelling to justify even "unduly
burdensome" abortion restrictions, id. at 2817. See notes 314-33 and accompanying text
(discussing Casey).
87. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 8 (1972) (observing "scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").
88. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (holding unconstitutional Georgia's statute,
based on the Model Penal Code, allowing abortions under specified conditions). Justice White's
statement that Roe invalidated "most existing state abortion statutes" appears to be an understatement. See id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
89. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
90. See also Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (holding that the Social Security Act does not
require participating states to provide Medicaid coverage for nontherapeutic abortions); Poelker
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that Maher's reasoning validates a city's
prohibition of nontherapeutic abortions in a public hospital).
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1980, in Harris v. McRae,91 the Court extended this holding to cover
selective funding that excludes therapeutic abortions, that is, terminations of pregnancies posing health risks.9 '
The Court observed that, in protecting particular rights
against state action, the Fourteenth Amendment addresses only
state-imposed obstacles, 93 penalties, 94 restrictions, 95 and "unduly burdensome" interferences. 96 In deciding that selective funding does not
impose an undue burden on the right to an abortion, the Court explained that constitutional protection from state action impinging on
a right does not confer an "entitlement 97 to state support for the right
because privacy and other fundamental rights are exclusively negative rights.98 As a result, governmental refusals to subsidize or otherwise facilitate the exercise of protected rights do not count as
"deprivations" or "denials," the only kind of state action addressed by
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees. 99 As the Court subsequently clarified, state action and state inaction are governed by different rules, and the Court will characterize as an omission the
failure to fund or provide a particular service or to take a particular
protective step in a larger state assistance program. 10° Thus, the
government's selective provision of an expansive range of medical
services, including care incident to continued pregnancy and
childbirth but excluding abortion, evokes only rational-basis review. 01
91. 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (validating the federal "Hyde Amendment"). While the 1977
holdings rested on the Equal Protection Clause (including strict scrutiny for fundamental
rights), McRae asked similar questions under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
92. See also Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980) (validating a similar state statute).
Although both the federal and state measures offered abortion assistance for life-threatening
pregnancies, the Court's reasoning in both cases would have supported provisions without such
exceptions.
93. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474; McRae, 448 U.S. at 316.
94. Maher,432 U.S. at 474 n.8; McRae, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.
95. Maher,432 U.S. at 474; McRae, 448 U.S. at 314.
96. Maher,432 U.S. at 474; McRae, 448 U.S. at 314.
97. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316, 318.
98. Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions
of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights
Thesis, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 721, 734-36 (1981).
99. See id. at 748.
100. See, for example, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S.
189, 202 (1989) (holding that the state's failure to protect a child from a violent father is not
actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, even though a social
services agency had investigated the problem and made recommendations). But see id. at 20405 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that the state had taken action); Patricia M. Wald,
Government Benefits: A New Look at an Old Gifthorse, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 247, 262 (1990) ("[The]
county's relationship with [the victim in DeShaney] cannot accurately be described as
'inaction' ").
101. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474, 478; McRae, 448 U.S. at 316-17, 324. But compare Michael W.
McConnell, The Selective FundingProblem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 Harv. L. Rev.
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The abortion-funding cases did not explain why any standard
of review should govern state inaction, given the Due Process Clause's
exclusive aim at official action. 102 Nonetheless, the Court examined
whether the denial of abortion funding for indigents rested on a rational basis, a balancing test so deferential to state authority that
courts themselves will supply a justifying state interest completely
apart from the reasons for a law's enactment. 103 Although subsidizing
childbirth proves more costly than subsidizing abortion 104 and
although refusals to fund therapeutic abortions would seem to
undermine the state interest in maternal health, asserted in support
of many abortion restrictions and recognized in Roe, 0 5 the Court
found the required rational basis in official value judgments
preferring childbirth over abortion.10 The state can use its largesse to
encourage some behaviors and discourage others, even behaviors with
fundamental-rights status. 10 7 This analysis also suggests that the
Court believes public funds serve an expressive function, putting the
state on record regarding the policy choices it seeks to support and
those it seeks to disavow.
The Court invoked private-school education as an analogy.
Although parents have a fundamental, substantive due process right
to select private schooling for their children, a choice the state cannot
prohibit, 08 the Constitution does not require state subsidies for such
education. Rather, the state can encourage parents to choose public

989, 1003, 1046 (1991) (theorizing that a government's failure to fund raises constitutional
problems only when the government funds substitutes for constitutionally protected activities,
for example, funding childbirth but not abortion).
102. In other words, the Court failed to explain why it did not simply end its analysis once
it determined that no "deprivation" or "denial" had occurred. See Appleton, 81 Colum. L. Rev. at
748-49 (cited in note 98). Compare Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1425 (1989) (arguing that minimum rationality is required even for the
government's distribution of "gratuitous" benefits).
103. See Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw 1443 (Foundation Press, 2d ed.
1988) (stating that, in effect, rational-basis review amounts to no serious review at all).
104. The Court so observed in the abortion-funding cases. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 468, 47879. If the resulting child is supported by public assistance, the difference in costs obviously
increases. See Michael J. Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde
Amendment Case: A BriefComment on Harris v. McRae, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1113, 1124 (1980).
105. 410 U.S. at 163. See Appleton, 81 Colum. L. Rev. at 731-37 (cited in note 98).
106. Maher,432 U.S. at 474, 478; McRae, 448 U.S. at 314, 324-26.
107. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 ('CThe State may have made childbirth a more attractive
alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision"); McRae, 448 U.S. at 325 (noting how
"Congress has established incentives that make childbirth a more attractive alternative than
abortion"). Compare Rosenthal, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 1158-59 (cited in note 59) (theorizing
various reasons for the refusal to fund abortions).
108. Pierce, 268 U.S. 510.
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schooling by making it available at no cost, through public financial
support, while leaving private schools accessible only to those who can
find their own means to pay tuition.109
The abortion-funding cases remain excruciatingly hard to reconcile with the long line of decisions invalidating "unconstitutional
conditions." 110 Those decisions struck down governmental efforts to
condition receipt of a benefit on the sacrifice of a constitutional right.
For example, the state cannot require workers seeking unemployment
compensation to forego religious observance of their Sabbath, as the
Court held in Sherbert v. Verner."' Given such precedents, why don't
funds for childbirth but not abortion fall as unconstitutional conditions? Only poor women who forego their protected right to abortion
can receive medical care at state expense.
In response, the Court sought to distinguish a state's failure to
pay for a given activity (permissible under the abortion-funding cases)
from a state's imposition of a penalty-financial or otherwise-as the
result of one's exercise of a protected right (impermissible under the
unconstitutional conditions cases).12 According to the Court, a penalty occurs only when the state deprives the right-holder of something
that otherwise belonged to him or her-again, reflecting reliance on
the active/passive dichotomy."3 To conclude that no penalty was at
work in the abortion-funding cases, however, the Court had to isolate

109. Maher,432 U.S. at 476-77. The Court developed a similar analogy regarding foreign
language instruction. Id.
110. See generally, for example, Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court-1987 Term,
Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 89-91 (1988); Sullivan, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 1413 (cited in note 102); Cass R. Sunstein, Is
There an Unconstitutional ConditionsDoctrine?,26 San Diego L. Rev. 337 (1989). But see Lynn
A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of UnconstitutionalConditions, 75
Cornell L. Rev. 1185 (1990) (presenting a theory to explain the outcomes in cases). Compare
Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (With
ParticularReference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. Rev. 593 (1990) (attempting
to reformulate the doctrine in light of modern functions).
111. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). For a more recent case recognizing the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317, 129 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1994)
(relying on the doctrine in protecting'a landowner's rights under the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause).
112. McRae, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.
113. Id. But see, for example, Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88
Mich. L. Rev. 2271, 2297-2308 (1990) (criticizing the penalty/subsidy distinction as questionable). There are other ways to attempt to express the distinction between the two lines of cases
but they prove equally slippery. See, for example, Seth F. Kreimer, AllocationalSanctions: The
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293, 1352-53 (1984)
(contrasting threats versus offers); Pildes, 45 Hastings L. J. at 738-39 (cited in note 81)
(discussing unconstitutional constraints operating directly on rights versus "program-defining"
conditions); Sullivan, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 1427 (cited in note 102) (inferring that the choice
must lie ahead, not behind).
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the non-funding of abortions from the larger Medicaid program that
provides the poor with virtually all other medical care, including
subsidized childbirth."1
Put differently, in the abortion-funding
cases, the Court assumed the "baseline" for determining the existence
of a penalty was the absence of funds for any medical care at all.
From this perspective, the state has not acted at all with respect to
abortion though it has provided support for other medical services.
But the state's subsidy of all other medical care besides abortion represents an equally plausible baseline; from this starting point for the
analysis, the state is singling out abortion for unfavorable treatment,
compared to other medical care. 115 Numerous other plausible baselines exist as well.116
The reasoning in the abortion-funding cases casts new light on
earlier cases, notably Dandridge v. Williams,
which upheld
Maryland's dollar limit on public assistance to a single family, said to
serve rationally as an incentive for family planning. 118 In addition,
the reasoning has continued to gain momentum and new applications."19 It reached one peak in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
114. Appleton, 81 Colum. L. Rev. at 738-40 (cited in note 98).
115. See Sullivan, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 1440 (cited in note 102). See also note 101
(summarizing McConnell's argument). Compare Charles R. Bogle, Note, Unconscionable
Conditions: A ContractualAnalysis of Conditions on Public Assistance Benefits, 94 Colum. L.
Rev. 193, 237 (1994) (arguing that, although the government does not monopolize health care, it
has displaced private actors by subsidizing almost all medical care for the poor).
116. See Kreimer, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1358-74 (cited in note 113) (examining as possible
baselines: history, equality, and prediction).
117. 397 U.S. 471,484-87 (1970).
118. The Court also justified Maryland's action as "an incentive to seek gainful employment." Id. at 486.
The abortion-finding cases also provide an analytic framework that brings some order to
the otherwise confusing "pregnancy-discrimination" cases. See, for example, Nashville Gas Co.
v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). See also Appleton, 81 Colum. L. Rev. at 749-50 n.216 (cited in
note 98).
119. For example, courts have rejected substantive due process challenges to allocations of
public funds that operate as financial disincentives to close family relationships, notwithstanding the constitutional protection for such relationships recognized in cases such as Stanley, 405
U.S. at 650-52, and Moore, 431 U.S. at 499. See, for example, Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635
(1986) (upholding as rational a statutory distinction between households composed of immediate
family members and those composed of distant relatives and unrelated persons, resulting in a
smaller allotment of food stamps for the former); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 609 (1987)
(upholding an AFDC amendment requiring consideration of support payments by noncustodial
parents); Libscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1384 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding subsidies for
foster care by nonrelatives only). Of the cases cited, however, only Libscomb expressly relies on
the abortion-funding cases. 962 F.2d at 1379. Compare Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374 (holding
marriage restrictions unconstitutional), with Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 58 (1977)
(upholding the termination of secondary benefits for disabled, dependent children upon
marriage). See also Lyng v. InternationalUnion, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 369 (1988) (citing McRae
to uphold ineligibility for food stamps of any household while any member is on strike).
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Department of Social Services,120 in which the Court relied on these
cases to find no constitutional violation in the state's failure to protect
an abused child from his violent father, notwithstanding that state
social service workers had notice of the problem, had previously
investigated the family, and had entered into an agreement with the
father in an effort to halt the abuse.121 The Court explained that the
Due Process Clause confers "no affirmative right to governmental aid,
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the
individual.' ' 22 This approach peaked again in Rust v. Sullivan,123
which established that first amendment values do not change the
basic analysis. As a result, the "gag rule's" withholding of public financial support from family planning clinics that provide abortion
counselling survived constitutional challenge, for, once again, government can fund what it wishes and, through its expenditures, it can
24
promote chosen values and seek to mold the behavior of recipients1
Finally, for some of the Justices, the abortion-funding cases have
oozed beyond the limits spelled out in their underlying rationale,
providing authority to support even active intrusion on protected
1 25

rights.

C. The Abortion-FundingApproach to Welfare Reforms
The reasoning in the abortion-funding cases apparently legitimizes the most controversial of the proposed welfare reforms. Under
this approach, government can influence the most intimate, personal,
and physical choices through its allocations of public funds. If a legislature seeks to deter childbearing among welfare recipients by providing financial incentives for use of Norplant or by refusing to subsidize
the birth and care of additional children, so the argument goes, the
Constitution will not prohibit such efforts so long as they have a ra120. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
121. See note 100.
122. 489 U.S. at 196 (citingMcRae).
123. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). See also Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490,
507-13 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of a Missouri statute prohibiting the use of public
employees and facilities for abortions unnecessary to save the mother's life).
124. Compare David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of
Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675 (1992) (analyzing and critiquing Rusts approach to selective subsidies of speech); McConnell, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 1023-31
(cited in note 101) (giving the pre-Rust analysis); Gary A. Winters, Note, Unconstitutional
Conditions as '?Nonsubsidies" When Is Deference Inappropriate?,80 Georegetown L. J. 131
(1991) (criticizing Rust).
125. See notes 292-333 and accompanying text. See also Appleton, 81 Colum. L. Rev. at
750-53 (cited in note 98) (predicting this expansion).

1996]

WELFARE REFORMS

tional relation to the desired end. If official value judgments supplied
the requisite rational basis in the abortion-funding cases, it follows
that value judgments can perform the same role in justifying welfare
reforms. 126 Hence, concerns expressed by Congress and state legislatures about the increasing number of births to welfare mothers and
the rising rate of illegitimacy appear as prima facie justifications for
the proposed reforms, dooming any constitutional challenge following
their enactment.
Not surprisingly, in an early test, C.K. v. Shalala,127 New
Jersey's so-called "family cap" withstood claims of unconstitutionality
in an opinion in which the district judge relied on the abortion-funding rationale.128 The challengers had argued that strict judicial scrutiny applies because, in the court's words, "the Family Cap is a governmental attempt to alter recipients' reproductive behavior by denying them benefits should they make procreative decisions disfavored
by the state.1' 29 The court rejected this argument, explaining that a
state "is not obligated to remove obstacles that it did not create"13o and
that the scheme leaves recipients free to bear additional children,
albeit without additional state assistance. Under the rational-basis
test dictated by the abortion-funding cases, New Jersey's welfare
reforms survive based on their relationship "to the legitimate state
interests of altering the cycle of welfare dependency that [New Jersey]
has determined AFDC engenders in its recipients as well as promoting individual responsibility and family stability.'' 3
No doubt because of the obvious parallel to the abortion-funding cases, the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim played only a
bit part in their challenge, with other arguments, particularly those
based on the Administrative Procedure Act, dominating their briefs.32
126. Compare Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the
State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1348, 1349 (1994) (arguing that the Constitution forbids state action
that has no purpose other than moral standard-setting), with Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest
Analysis and the ChannelingFunction, in Gottlieb, ed., Public Values in ConstitutionalLaw 97
(cited in note 81) (theorizing that family laws perform a "channeling' function that the Court
has undervalued in privacy cases).
127. 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995).
128. Id. at 1014-15. The court used the term "family cap" to describe New Jersey's denial of
additional funds to welfare families upon the birth of additional children. See text accompanying note 14. Critics of such reforms claim that the term "child exclusion" more accurately
describes how these measures operate. See notes 225-32 and accompanying text.
129. 883 F. Supp. at 1014.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1015.
132. In support of their motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs devoted just seven pages
out of fifty-nine to their claim based on "the fundamental right to procreative choice." The
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No matter how coercively and intrusively a family cap operates on
constitutionally protected reproductive decision making, absent some
points of distinction, such contentions are the same as those that
failed to carry the day in the abortion-funding cases. 133 If government

can allocate public funds to discourage abortions, in accord with its
own value judgments, then it presumably follows that New Jersey can
use the same method and invoke similar reasons to discourage
4
childbirth."
The remainder of this Article explores the possible grounds for
intensifying the judicial scrutiny of certain privacy-invading welfare
reforms, notwithstanding the abortion-funding cases. If successful,
this quest for an elevated standard of review will not mean that
welfare can never be changed; it will mean, however, that the reforms
considered here must undergo close examination by the courts, which
will look beyond stereotypes and political popularity for justifications.
This search concludes that, while equal protection norms offer some
foundation for an elevated standard of review, an examination of the
"undue-burden" test-a test with some of its strongest roots in the
abortion-funding cases-ultimately provides a more promising path.

remainder of the brief advanced arguments under the Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L.
No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (1994 ed.), the Social
Security Act, HHS regulations governing experimentation involving pregnant women and
fetuses, and constitutional irrationality. Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment, C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995). See also Plaintiffs' Brief
in Opposition to Federal Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F.
Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995). The court rejected all of plaintiffs' contentions. 883 F. Supp. at 1015.
133. Plaintiffs argued in C.K. that unlike "a governmental decision not to subsidize one
particular act related to procreative choice," New Jersey's law constitutes a denial of "general
welfare benefits" to women exercising the disfavored choice and, that as such, it is an "obstacle"
making plaintiffs "worse off' than otherwise, hence meriting strict scrutiny. Brief in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 57-58 (cited in note 132). See also Brief in
Opposition to Federal Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 41-42 (cited in note 132);
Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 14-15, C.K., 883 F. Supp.
991 (D. N.J. 1995) (same argument). The court disagreed, citing McRae and Rust for the
proposition that "while a state may not hinder one's exercise of protected choices, it is not
obligated to remove obstacles that it did not create, including a lack of financial resources."
C.K., 883 F. Supp. at 1014. Compare Yvette M. Barksdale, And the Poor Have Children: A
Harm-Based Analysis of Family Caps and the Hollow Procreative Rights of Welfare
Beneficiaries, 14 L. & Ineq. J. 1 (forthcoming 1995) (analyzing harms under the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine); Laura M. Friedman, Comment, Family Cap and the Unconstitutional
ConditionsDoctrine: Scrutinizing a Welfare Woman's Right to Bear Children, 56 Ohio St. L. J.
637 (1995) (attempting an unconstitutional conditions analysis).
134. I explored this argument fully, long before the current debate on welfare reform, in
Susan Frelich Appleton, The Abortion-Funding Cases and Population Control: An Imaginary
Lawsuit (and Some Reflections on the Uncertain Limits of Reproductive Privacy), 77 Mich. L.
Rev. 1688 (1979). See also Eve W. Paul and Paula Schaap, Abortion and the Law in 1980, 25
N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 497, 520 n.121 (1980) (citing an unpublished Arizona challenge to local
funding of abortion and sterilization but not prenatal care and childbirth).
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IV. ELEVATING THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR WELFARE REFORMS

The conclusion that the undue-burden test, a standard of
review designed to give the government a larger role in reproductive
decision making, 135 should apply to privacy-invading welfare reforms
is disquieting to say the least.136 Yet it is a conclusion built frankly on
two foundations: the Court's clear rejection of strict scrutiny for
allocations of public funds and my own certainty that welfare
reformers' explicit efforts to manipulate private choices must evoke
more than rational-basis review. Many features of the undue-burden
test, including its immaturity in the courts, 37 make it suitable for
development as a means of strengthening judicial review of welfare
reforms. Adopting this test as a compromise would serve the right to
privacy, not dilute it, because financial coercion undertaken to alter
private behavior necessarily imposes an unconstitutional undue
burden.
But first, another avenue for sharpening judicial scrutiny of
modern welfare reforms-their express and inherent discrimination-merits attention.
A. Welfare Reforms and Equal Protection
Although the abortion-funding cases explicitly rejected an
equal protection challenge resting on wealth discrimination,138judicial
opinions and the literature agree that the freedom accorded to states
in the distribution of subsidies does not permit invidious discrimination.139 Hence, welfare reforms embodying invidious discrimination
135. See notes 297-333 and accompanying text.
136. As Kate Bartlett has written after supporting the role of tradition in feminist legal

thought:
I am worried about a movement whose identity seems too often connected with a
relentless pushing away from a contaminated past....
But with this worry comes anxiety-anxiety about whether all this represents
womanly compromise, about whether I have prescribed a solution ripe for co-optation,
and about whether I have taken shots at forefront feminism only to abdicate to a
watered-down sell-out.
Bartlett, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. at 342 (cited in note 78). I feel similar anxiety about advancing the
undue burden test.
137. But see Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed. The Role of Undue-Burden
Analysis in ConstitutionalDoctrine, 45 Hastings L. J. 867, 872 (1994) (citing the undue-burden
test as a standard reflected "throughout the fundamental rights case law of the past forty
years").
138. Maher,432 U.S. at 470-71; McRae, 448 U.S. at 322-23.
139. See, for example, Califano, 443 U.S. at 89 (holding that sex discrimination in the
provision of AFDC unemployment benefits is unconstitutional); United States Dept. of
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would not evoke the deference to state value judgments used in the
abortion-funding cases, and classifications triggering heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause would require precisely
the same level of judicial review in the evaluation of welfare measures
as they command in other contexts. 140 Indeed, tenBroek's expressed
hope for a constitutional solution to the dual system of family law
contemplated reliance on a still developing equality doctrine.'14
Against this background, three bases of discrimination merit
consideration: race, gender, and birth status. Although all three
provide insights about precisely which groups will bear the brunt of
welfare reforms, the analysis of birth status will probably prove most
convincing to courts and least susceptible to welfare reformers' efforts
2
to obscure the problem.1

1. Race: Welfare Stereotypes
In the United States, race oppression and poverty are intimately related.14 The sheer existence of such milestones as Brown v.
Board of Education,'" Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 145 and official
affirmative action programs, 46 shows that, during various periods in
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35, 538 (1973) (holding that discrimination against
hippies in the distribution of food stamps violates equal protection); Lyng, 485 U.S. at 370 n.8
(stating that Moreno applied the rational-basis test, but held that a statute cannot be saved by
relation to an illegitimate governmental objective). See Gerald E. Frug, The JudicialPower of
the Purse, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715, 780 (1978); Seth F. Kreimer, Government 'Largesse" and
ConstitutionalRights: Some Paths Through and Around the Swamp, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 229,
230 (1989); Wald, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 256 (cited in note 100) (advocating an equal protection
rather than an unconstitutional conditions analysis of governmental benefit schemes).
140. The abortion-funding cases stated that rational-basis review governed because no
state action had impinged a fundamental right. See notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
Similarly, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, applied rational-basis review after finding no fundamental
right at stake. Both authorities strongly suggest that the standard of review would prove
determinative, with value judgments alone offering a sufficient state interest only under the
minimal review of the rational-basis test.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, could make this
generalization problematic, however, if one reads the joint opinion to mean that value
judgments alone can provide adequate justifications under the heightened (but not strict)
scrutiny of the undue-burden test. See also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 568-72
(1991) (plurality opinion) (justifying a ban on nude dancing, despite its limitations on some
expressive activity, with the state's interest in protecting morality). But see note 391 and
accompanying text.
141. See notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
142. See note 260 and accompanying text.
143. Edelman, 81 Georgetown L. J. at 1698 (cited in note 44).
144. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
145. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1988 ed. & Supp. V).
146. But see Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding that racebased preferences in affirmative action for federal contracts must satisfy strict scrutiny). In the
contemporary political climate, Adarand could signal the beginning of the end of such programs.
See, for example, Steven A. Holmes, G.O.P. Lawmakers Offer a Ban on Federal Affirmative

1996]

WELFARE REFORMS

27

our recent national history, African-American citizens have suffered
significant disadvantages in education and employment on the basis
of their race. With education and previous employment experience
cited as two primary predictors of those likely to exit welfare on the
basis of earnings, 147 it should come as no surprise that victims of discrimination in education and employment face a significant risk of
poverty. Demographic studies show that a disproportionate number
of African-American families live in poverty, 14 even though the poor is
a group of considerable diversity in terms of race, 149 as well as geography, age, and ability to work. 150
Race has played a notable role in the history of welfare. At one'
time African-Americans were excluded from the Social Security program, 151 the legislative home of the modern welfare system.152 Not
surprisingly, the officially sanctioned racial divisions that characterized so many aspects of American life infected welfare as well. A
separate movement led by African-American women, shunned by
their white counterparts, paralleled the mainstream efforts historically credited with establishing what became AFDC.153
The
distinctive approach of this black movement reflected a resistance to
means- and morals-testing T, and an acceptance of employment for
married women, with women's economic independence as an explicit
goal.15

Action, N.Y. Times A17 (July 28, 1995); B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., California Board Ends
Preferences in College System, N.Y. Times Al (July 21, 1995).
147. Bane and Ellwood, Welfare Realities at 61, 97 (cited in note 36). A third important
variable, a male partner for a poor woman, see id. at 50, 55-56, is discussed at note 202 and
accompanying text.
148. See Edelman, 81 Georgetown L. J. at 1706 & nn.45-46 (cited in note 44) (citing census
figures for households with children and female-headed households with no spouse present).
149. See Note, 107 Harv. L. Rev. at 2019-20 (cited in note 37) (citing statistics on the racial
composition of the welfare population). See also White, 26 Conn. L. Rev. at 861 (cited in note 3)
(summarizing statistics).
150. See Edelman, 81 Georgetown L. J. at 1706-08 (cited in note 44).
151. See Minow, 26 Conn. L. Rev. at 824 (cited in note 5). See also David Stoesz, Poor
Policy: The Legacy of the Kerner Commission for Social Welfare, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1675, 1675
(1993) (reporting that Charity Organization Societies refused to include African-Americans and
that the Social Security Act of 1935, as a "tactical concession to southern legislators," excluded
domestic and agricultural workers, mostly African-Americans).
152. See generally Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled at 253-85 (cited in note 39) (detailing
the history of the Social Security Act).
153. See id. at 111-43 (including a separate chapter on welfare activism by AfricanAmerican women).
154. See id. at 129-30.
155. See id. at 135-37.
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There is evidence of the importance of race in the calls for
welfare reform as well. In the 1960s, Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
speaking for the Department of Labor, singled out the AfricanAmerican family's matriarchal structure for blame in the increasing
incidence of welfare dependency among blacks. 156 Condemnation of
existing programs has expressly targeted single mothers who are
alleged to continue reproducing just to maintain and increase their
benefits: so-called "welfare queens.''157 Despite the racial diversity of

welfare recipients, the "welfare queen" is stereotypically black. 158
Data about the higher fertility rate among single African-American
females compared to single white females reinforce this stereotype.15 9
By supporting these black women and their many children, welfare is
said to enable them to create and perpetuate a variety of social ills,
including rising rates of violent crime and drug abuse. 60 Indeed,
Lucie White persuasively theorizes that the popular image of an unmarried African-American mother as the typical welfare recipient
explains why middle-class and elite women have not followed their
foremothers as activists supporting welfare.161
Legislative efforts to reform welfare reveal explicit considerations of race. Indeed, the evidence is remarkable, given the modern
political taboo against overt race discrimination. In the initial bill
passed by the House, the section reflecting the "sense of Congress"
expresses in racially specific terms the negative consequences of outof-wedlock births, providing official recognition of welfare
stereotypes. 16 2 Accordingly, it indicates that Congress has been
156. See Minow, 26 Conn. L. Rev. at 836, n.107 (cited in note 5) (citing the '"Moynihan
Report").
157. See generally Note, 107 Harv. L. Rev. at 2013 (cited in note 37).
158. Id. at 2019-20. See Kimberly J. McLarin, For the Poor, Defining Who Deserves What,
N.Y. Times § 4 at 4 (Sept. 27, 1995); Mink, 26 Conn. L. Rev. at 881 (cited in note 42); Murray,
Losing Ground at 18, 162 (cited in note 37); Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking 'Welfare
Dependency" from a Different Ground, 81 Georgetown L. J. 1961, 1966 (1993). See also
Catherine Albiston, The Social Meaning of the Norplant Condition:
Constitutional
Considerations of Race, Class, and Gender, 9 Berkeley Women's L. J. 9, 17-18 (1994) (citing
racist assumptions underlying the "welfare queen" stereotype).
159. See, for example, Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 701 n.12 (8th
Cir. 1987) (offering a higher fertility rate for black women as evidence to show the disparate
impact of a rule prohibiting unwed pregnancy). See also Murray, Losing Ground at 127 (cited in
note 37) (noting that there is a higher fertility rate for single black teenagers). But see U.S.
Fertility Rates Fell During 1992, Even Among Black Teenagers, Women Over 30, 27 Family
Planning Perspectives 91, 91 (1995) (reporting the recent decline in the nonmarital fertility rate
among blacks and a rise among whites).
160. See Minow, 26 Conn. L. Rev. at 836-37 (cited in note 5); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value
of Black Mothers' Work, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 871, 877 (1994). See also Murray, Losing Ground at
175 (cited in note 37) (summarizing the factors to which he attributes the rise in crime).
161. White, 26 Conn. L. Rev. at 853-55 (cited in note 3).
162. H.R. 4 § 100 (cited in note 9).
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motivated to write this legislation because the illegitimacy rate for
"black Americans was 26 percent in 1965, but today the rate is 68
percent and climbing.' ' 6 3 (For whites, it has risen "from 2.29 percent
in 1960 to 22 percent today."'6)
Similarly, "the likelihood that a
young black man will engage in criminal activities doubles if he is
raised without a father and triples if he lives in a neighborhood with a
high concentration of single parent families. '' 165 At the very least, this
evidence shows that race was consciously on the minds of those voting
for the bill. 16 In addition, some members of Congress have been
caught speaking of welfare reform in racially charged terms. 167 State
lawmakers have made such remarks as well.168 Finally, observers
have detected the role of race in the legislative efforts to reform
welfare even when race has not been mentioned expressly.169
Although, without more, racially disproportionate effects of
legislation will not satisfy the "intent to discriminate" necessary to
evoke the compelling-state-interest test that makes race-based classifications presumptively unconstitutional,170 it remains to be decided
whether official actions premised on racial stereotypes and explicit
references to race trigger such strict scrutiny. Making such sterotypes count in constitutional analysis would not require adopting
Barbara Flagg's intriguing proposal to invalidate "transparently

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. By contrast, the Senate's findings on illegitimacy, single-parenthood, and welfare dependency-recited in support of its goal of "promoting responsible parenting"-are presented
without any racially specific references. H.R. 4 § 101 (cited in note 15) (replacement for § 406 of
the Social Security Act). The conference report follows the Senate's approach. See, for example,
141 Cong. Rec. at H15319 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (H.R. 4 § 101).
167. See, for example, Carl Rowan, DuplicitousNewt a Bigot in Denial, Chicago Sun-Times,
Editorial Section 39 (June 21, 1995) (reporting Newt Gingrich's declaration that blacks are
lazier than whites and his claim that poverty is caused by laziness); DeWayne Wickham,
Gingrich Blames Poor for 'Self-Made' Poverty, USA Today 11A (July 3, 1995) (reporting
Gingrich's statement about how blacks could get out of the "poorhouse'.
168. See, for example, Iver Peterson, The Governor and Race: Off the Cuff, Off Key, N.Y.
Times § 13 at 2 (April 30, 1995) (reporting how New Jersey's Governor described black young
men bragging about the numbers of illegitimate children); Nicholas Goldberg, Silver: Bruno
Courting Bigots, Newsday A4 (April 10, 1995) (reporting that the New York State Assembly
Speaker said blacks and Hispanics have "their hands out" for welfare payments).
169. See, for example, Jack Germond and Jules Witcover, Welfare Debate Is Lively, Major
Reforms Unlikely, Baltimore Sun 2A (Aug. 2, 1995) (stating that "race is obviously a factor" in
Congress's efforts to give states the responsibility for welfare eligibility); Robin Toner, Ideas and
Trends: The New Bipartisanship;Resolved: No More Bleeding Hearts, N.Y. Times § 4 at 1 (July
16, 1995) (reporting that Rep. John Lewis of Atlanta said race matters in welfare reform).
170. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976). See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535, 547-49 (1972).
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white" decision making.17, Nor would it necessarily require strict
scrutiny for all measures reflecting exclusively unconscious racism
under the "cultural meaning" test advanced by Charles Lawrence.172
The suggestion posed here is a more modest one, addressing
only decision making that more closely resembles what Title VII caselaw calls a "pretext" for disparate treatment 173 than what it calls discrimination based on "disparate impact.' 174

Stereotypical thinking

about men and women has often signalled the presence of unconstitutional sex discrimination, at least in cases of explicit classifications.175

171. Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See" White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement ofDiscriminatoryIntent, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 953 (1993).
172. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987). In rejecting the rule that confines strict
judicial scrutiny to official decisions showing an intent to discriminate, assumed to operate at a
conscious level, Lawrence proposes that "proof that governmental action will be interpreted in
racial terms should lead a court to closely scrutinize that action," so long as such "racial
understanding will be widely shared within the predominant culture." Id. at 375, 379. But as
Lawrence points out, sometimes state actors with economic purposes display a "'selective
sympathy and indifference' [that] could have occurred at a conscious or unconscious level." Id.
at 348 (quoting Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple,90 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 7 (1976), and analyzing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), which held that proof of racially discriminatory intent
is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause). Lawrence goes on to say: "It is
more than likely that the decisionmakers [in Arlington Heights] knew that the poor people they
were excluding [by refusing to rezone for a low-income housing development] were black, but
they would not be likely to have known that they undervalued the cost to poor people because
they thought of them as black rather than white." Id. at 348.
A similar mixture of conscious and unconscious consideration of race appears at work in the
welfare reform movement.
Interestingly, Lawrence classifies limits on subsidies to the poor as "hard cases" for establishing discrimination under his proposed test. See id. at 376-78. The questions he would have
plaintiffs ask survey respondents, in order to satisfy his test, include in pertinent part: 'Do
most people think of all AFDC recipients as black... ? Do these perceptions reflect statistical
reality, or are they based on generalizations? Do the survey respondents hold pejorative beliefs
about AFDC recipients that coincide with prevalent racial stereotypes?" Id. at 377. He would
also have courts examine "contemporaneous policy discussions within the academic and political
communities... as well as media coverage of the debate over welfare legislation." Id. at 378.
At this particular time in history, the movement for welfare reform should satisfy
Lawrence's test.
173. See McDonnellDouglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (interpreting Title VII
to prohibit the use of conduct as a pretext for discrimination).
174. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428-30 (1971) (rejecting the requirement
of a discriminatory purpose for a Title VII violation). Alternatively, in writing about sex
discrimination in employment, Nadine Taub has proposed "stereotyping per se as a [separate]
concept of discrimination" under Title VII. Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place:
StereotypingPerSe as a Form of Employment Discrimination,21 B.C. L. Rev. 345, 402 (1980).
175. See, for example, Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-83 (1979) (holding that an Alabama
statute imposing alimony obligations on husbands but not wives violates equal protection);
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1980) (holding that a state
university nursing school's discrimination against men violates equal protection). In these
cases, the stereotype violates equal protection even if it proves statistically accurate because it
overlooks possible exceptions to the rule and creates a self-fulfilling prophecy. But compare
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While the Supreme Court has imposed an extremely demanding test
for establishing the requisite discriminatory intent in a facially neutral law,176 some decisions invite consideration of the racism found in
the history of welfare, as well as the racial stereotypes and racially
specific data animating modern welfare reforms.'" Applying strict
judicial scrutiny to laws that rest on such overt racial elements would
be entirely compatible with a colorblind approach to constitutional
analysis. 178
2. Gender: Biology, History, and Role Assignments
While race discrimination activates strict judicial scrutiny, sex
discrimination calls for intermediate scrutiny, a heightened standard
of review requiring at least an important state interest and a
1 9
substantial relationship between legislative means and end.
Gender discrimination is not insulated from this standard of review
simply because it occurs in the distribution of governmental
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (upholding an
employment preference for veterans despite the impact on women).
176. The Court has held that statistical evidence of disparate impact alone is insufficient to
establish discriminatory intent, see Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-65, that generally it will
decline to inquire into legislative "motives," see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25
(1971), and that the challenger of the law must show that the legislature "selected . . . a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group," Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
177. Just as "pretextual" decision making can be established in employment-discrimination
litigation, see text accompanying note 173, it can presumably be established in constitutional
challenges as well. For example, in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), the Court
invalidated part of the Alabama Constitution disenfranchising those convicted of crimes of
moral turpitude; the Court relied both on evidence of the statistical impact on black voters, id.
at 227, and the history of the provision's enactment, id. at 228-31. See Paul Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 95 (proposing a more probing search for illicit motives). Compare generally Tribe,
American ConstitutionalLaw at 819-25 (cited in note 103).
In addition, the Court has indicated that a combination of invidious and legitimate bases for
enactment will not shield a law from strict review. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
Finally, both the explanation of the undue-burden test adopted by the Casey plurality, with
its focus on a law's "purpose or effect," Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820, and the Court's examination of
anti-abortion motives in pre-Casey opinions lend support to the idea of taking into account any
racial stereotypes underlying legislative action. See notes 322, 363-70 (providing more on
"purpose" in Casey's undue-burden analysis); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986) (holding unconstitutional a requirement "designed" to
persuade a woman to withhold consent for an abortion), overruled by Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791. On
the kinds of evidence that could establish an approach to welfare reform based on such racial
stereotypes, see notes 179-215 and accompanying text (discussing gender-based discrimination).
178. Compare generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44
Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
179. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724; Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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benefits. 180
Once again, however, established doctrine requires
showing more than a disproportionate effect on women (or men) to
support a claim of invidious sex discrimination181 Making a case for
the proposition that many proposed welfare reforms rely on invidious
gender-based discrimination perhaps calls for a less innovative
approach than charges of race discrimination, though it too requires
negotiating some hurdles.
Some proposals, such as "Norplant bonuses" and welfare cutoffs for unwed teenage mothers, inescapably target women. 82 Yet
early challenges to abortion restrictions and to pregnancy-based discrimination revealed a Court unable or unwilling to accept that such
rules, which necessarily address only females, amount to gender classifications.183 Despite an acknowledgment by several of the Justices
that they now "get it" with respect to abortion restrictions and sex
discriminationM and despite the presence on the Court of Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who years earlier addressed the equality issue
buried in Roe v. Wade, 85 some members of the Court continue to reject
attempts to equate an anti-abortion animus with sex discrimination. 86 Which of these two views about abortion ultimately prevails
180. See, for example, Califano, 443 U.S. at 85 (finding gender discrimination subject to

intermediate scrutiny in an AFDC benefit scheme based on the father's, but not the mother's,
unemployment). See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (involving a preintermediate scrutiny case holding discrimination in survivors' benefits under the Social
Security Act unconstitutional).
181. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 277-79. See also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding
that the exclusion of pregnancy from a state disability benefits plan is not invidious sex
discrimination). Compare note 170 and accompanying text.
182. See John Robert Hand, Note, Buying Fertility: The Constitutionality of Welfare
Bonuses for Welfare Mothers Who Submit to Norplant Insertion, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 715, 720
(1993); Jeanne L. Vance, Note, Womb for Rent: Norplant and the Undoing of Poor Women, 21
Hastings Const. L. Q. 827, 845-854 (1994). Compare Tracy Ballard, The Norplant Condition.
One Step Forwardor Two Steps Back?, 16 Harv. Women's L. J. 139, 160-63 (1993) (discussing
gender discrimination in criminal and child-abuse contexts).
183. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955, 97787 (1984) (tracing the separate development of the sex-equality doctrine and the constitutional
analysis of laws governing female reproduction).
184. See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2809 ('The ability of women to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives"); id. at 2842 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(asserting that the waiting period for abortion suggests women are "less capable of deciding
matters of gravity"); id. at 2846-47 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(claiming that abortion restrictions implicate gender equality).
185. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375 (1985). Justice Ginsburg's contributions as an attorney to the doctrine of unconstitutional gender discrimination are summarized in Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970's, 1989 U. Chi.
Legal Forum 9.
186. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 113 S.Ct. 753, 759, 122
L. Ed. 2d 34 (1993) (determining that anti-abortion demonstrations were not directed at women
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will help determine the analogous question whether Norplant bonuses
and measures based on unwed teenage childbirth constitute genderbased state action subject to intermediate scrutiny.
Seeing the gendered nature of other proposed welfare reforms
requires a closer look that encompasses three important points of
reference. First, welfare's history is even more infused with sex discrimination than race discrimination. Welfare began as an effort to
reward poor women who conformed to the gender-assigned roles
assumed by women of the elite and middle classes.'8 A defining feature of a woman's role was economic dependence, inevitably resulting
from the separate spheres allocated to each sex, the marketplace and
the public world of ideas for men contrasted with the private realm of
domesticity for women. 188 Mothers' Pensions and the later AFDC
were designed to allow poor, unmarried mothers to care for their
children at home, relying on funds that would come from the
government, rather than the husbands on whom their wealthier
counterparts depended. 189 In short, "the preservation of patriarchy"
has operated as a central, organizing principle of the welfare
system. 90
Second, many superficially gender-neutral reforms unquestionably target women, not men. The large majority of AFDC families
consist of women and their children.' 91 Moreover, although family
caps purport to address entire families, genderless collectives, they
seek to set a limit for-who else?-the "welfare queen," whose royal
title identifies her gender expressly, in contrast to the less explicit
racial implications of the term. 192 '"Welfare queens" are regarded as

as a class). Compare McConnell, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 1040-43 (cited in note 101) (arguing that

anti-abortion laws are based on concern for the unborn rather than on gender discrimination).
187. See note 42 and accompanying text.
188. See generally, for example, Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497 (1983).
189. See note 42 and accompanying text.
190. See Law, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1281 (cited in note 5). See also Fineman, The Neutered
Mother at 101-42 (cited in note 3) (arguing that single mothers are seen as deviant, reinforcing
male domination of the reproductive unit); Ellen Goodman, Where Have All PoorMothers Gone?
Gone to Work, Everyone, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 7B (Sept 20, 1995) (finding the end of "a long
cultural debate about motherhood" in plans to overhaul welfare).
191. Law, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1256 (cited in note 5). Men joined the AFDC ranks in
significant numbers only in 1961, when a parent's unemployment became a basis for assistance
for which federal matching funds would be available. Id. at 1259. More recent figures (for 1992)
place the average monthly number of adult female AFDC recipients at 3,931,624 compared to
503,107 for adult male recipients. United States Department of Health and Human Services,
AFDC Information Memorandum (No. ACF-IM-94-7) (Dec. 12, 1994).
192. See note 158 and accompanying text.
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the least deserving of the poor. 193 Beyond such stereotypes, however,
an implicit female norm makes it difficult to envision how such welfare reforms would operate without regard to gender. For example,
would proposals directed at "teenage parents" apply to a teenage male
who fathers a child with an adult woman?194 Under a family cap,
would the eligibility for assistance of a father's new child be
determined with reference to the welfare status of his other children,
born of different women, just as the children of women who conceive
with different men are considered? 195 Certainly, gender-specific
assumptions about the likely custodial parent of children on welfare
help construct this gendered norm, and these assumptions are
reinforced by all the ways that the law pressures women to be
custodial parents without so pressuring men.1 96 Even without such
assumptions, explicit concerns about single mothers and their
children have injected gender into the development of specific welfare
reforms with an openness virtually unthinkable today with respect to
race. 97 Both the House and Senate welfare-reform bills contain
numerous references to unmarried mothers, as does the conference
report. 198 To the extent that reducing "illegitimacy" is a primary goal
of these reform efforts, 199 recall that the traditional meaning of this

193. See McLarin, N.Y. Times (cited in note 158) (citing welfare author Michael B. Katz).
194. For example, would he be required to live with his parents, and attend school, see note
20 and accompanying text, in order for his child to receive public assistance?
195. Significantly, despite the New Jersey law's use of the gender-neutral verb "parents,"
both illustrations developed by the court to explain how the law operates describe the situation
of a welfare "mother." C.K, 883 F. Supp. at 999-1000.
196. See, for example, Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for
ParentalEquality, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1415, 1417-31 (1991); Law, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 988-98
(cited in note 183).
197. As a result, the evidence here exceeds that showing explicit consideration of race. See
notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
198. The House's welfare reform bill, which claims as its goal the reduction of out-ofwedlock births, emphasizes the problems of young, single mothers. H.R. 4 § 100 (cited in note 9)
(expressing the "sense of the Congress"). The Senate bill also stresses the plight of unmarried
mothers. H.R. 4 § 101 (cited in note 15) (replacement for § 406 of the Social Security Act).
Similar language appears in the conference report. 141 Cong. Rec. at H15319 (daily ed. Dec. 21,
1995) (H.R. 4 § 101). Individual lawmakers have articulated the objectives of welfare reform in
a gender-specific manner. See, for example, Eliza Newlin Carney, Legitimate Questions, 27
Natl. J. 679 (March 18, 1995) (quoting Rep. Talent: "fewer teenagers would make the decision
to become unmarried moms" under welfare reform); Pear, N.Y. Times § 1 at 1 (cited in note 20)
(reporting Sen. Dole's consideration of plans aimed at teen mothers). Compare Mink, 26 Conn.
L. Rev. at 883 (cited in note 42) ("Welfare politics has always been about gender roles and about
race and cultural order'); Katha Pollitt, Why I Hate "Family Values", in Katha Pollitt, ed.,
Reasonable Creatures: Essays on Women and Feminism 31, 40 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1995)
(concluding that "[flamily values and the cult of the nuclear family is... just another way to
bash women, especially poor women").
199. See H.R. 4 § 100 (cited in note 9); H.R. 4 § 101 (cited in note 15) (replacement for § 406
of the Social Security Act).
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20 0
term was based exclusively on the mother's marital status.
Similarly, how could a proposal for "wedfare," a scheme of financial
incentives to encourage welfare recipients to marry, possibly escape
charges of sex discrimination once this scheme acquires the nickname
"bridefare"201 and even government experts write about finding a
husband as one of the most promising "exits" from the rolls for
welfare mothers?202
Third, all women have long suffered unique disadvantages in
the workplace in obtaining jobs, in receiving compensation equivalent
to men's, and in attempting to balance family responsibilities with

work. 21 3 But as Sylvia Law documents, federal welfare law has ac-

tively exacerbated these inequities for poor women. 2 4 In 1971, statutory amendments to the Social Security Act imposed work
requirements on state AFDC plans for all able-bodied men and for
single mothers when their youngest child turned six, without any
such requirements for married women. 205 Later, the Department of
Labor was statutorily directed to favor unemployed fathers over
mothers for job placement. 20 6 Writing about work requirements
adopted by Congress in 1981, Law observes:
Federal welfare policy relies on the Employment Service to place the eligible
poor in jobs or training programs and the Service, in turn, shapes its
200. See Harry D. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 15-17 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1971)
(presenting the presumption of legitimacy for children born to married women).
201. See Kosterlitz, 25 Natl. J. at 272 (cited in note 47); Minow, 26 Conn. L. Rev. at 820
(cited in note 5). In interviewing welfare recipients about their reaction to the plan (then
phrased as a reward for teenage mothers who marry), a reporter elicited comments revealing
the gender-based underlying assumptions:
"These mothers have no control over whether these guys take a hike or not," said
Deborah Darden, a former welfare recipient ...."... I think a lot of them would love to
get married.... But what kind of song and dance are they supposed to do to get (to]
keep these men around?"
Isabel Wilkerson, Wisconsin Welfare Plan: To Reward the Married, N.Y. Times A16 (Feb. 12,
1991).
202. Bane and Ellwood, Welfare Realities at 50, 55-56 (cited in note 36). Bane now serves
as Assistant Secretary for Children and Families in the Department of Health and Human
Services; Ellwood serves in the same department as Assistant Secretary for Planning and
Evaluation. Id. at x.
203. See, for example, Victor R. Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic Equality 58 (Harvard
U., 1988) (contending that "[tihe conflict between family and career appears to be much greater
for women than for men, and the persistence of that conflict continues to frustrate women's
quest for economic equality'; Symposium on Gender Gap in Compensation, 82 Georgetown L. J.
27 (1993); Czapanskiy, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1454-57 (cited in note 196) (analyzing the
difficulties faced by women in the workplace).
204. Law, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1286-87 (cited in note 5).
205. Id. at 1264-65.
206. Id. at 1266-67 n.66.
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operations to conform to the discriminatory nature of the marketplace.
Federal welfare law, by attempting to force poor women into the job market
without taking steps to change the market's discriminatory structure, both
perpetuates the discriminatory structure and subjects poor women to its abuse.
Wage labor, moreover, is structured on the assumption that the workers have
someone to care for their children. Women receiving AFDC are, by definition,
responsible for the care of their children; AFDC mothers do not have wives.
Yet, federal policy refuses to consider the needs of children whose mothers do
20 7
full-time wagework.

Thus, facially neutral work requirements in today's reforms come
with significant discriminatory baggage, including some of quite
recent vintage.
Although the question examined here concerns the standard of
review that should apply to welfare reforms, not their ultimate constitutionality or unconstitutionality, a glimpse at possible governmental
interests is instructive. While condemning archaic stereotypes based
on gender,208 sex-discrimination precedents have emphasized the
importance of determining whether, in the particular context
addressed by a gender-specific law, females and males are "similarly
situated."20 9 These precedents have left unclear, however, whether a
determination that females and males are not similarly situated with
respect to a challenged law amounts to a conclusion that the discriminatory treatment is justified under heightened scrutiny or whether it
simply suspends the need to apply heightened scrutiny in the first
place.21° In other words, case law does not unequivocally establish
whether the "similarly-situated" test (invoked to uphold a statutory
rape law punishing only males2 11) emerges from the application of
intermediate scrutiny to sex discrimination or whether it spells out a
different, less demanding standard of review.
In any event, proposals for Norplant bonuses might be supported by the biological fact that only women can use this device.
Women and men, so the argument might go, are not similarly situated with respect to the use of Norplant. Yet the availability of male
contraceptives (and the absence of welfare plans relying on their use)
unmasks the true character of such proposals: They fail because they
rely on archaic stereotypes singling out women as solely responsible

207. Id. at 1283.
208. See note 175 and accompanying text.
209. See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981)
(plurality opinion).
210. See Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts,
and Feminism, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rptr. 175, 182-83 n.50 (1982).
211. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471-73.
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for the conception and birth 212 of additional welfare-dependent children. One can draw the same conclusion about welfare cutoffs for
teenage single mothers. Any argument that, for purposes of family
caps and bridefare plans, females and males are not similarly situated should also fail because classifying family size and marriage as
"women's problems" rests on impermissible stereotypes, not real
biological differences. 213 Certainly, a paternalistic effort to help vulnerable women make sound family choices will not support such
in other cases about
plans, as the Supreme Court has made 2plain
2 4 and reproduction. 15
autonomy in marriage
3. Birth Status: Child Exclusions, Not Family Caps
Finally, many of the proposed welfare reforms require heightened scrutiny because they expressly discriminate on the basis of a
child's birth status. Cases striking down laws disfavoring illegitimate
children provide the controlling precedents for this conclusion. In
describing this line of cases, the Court has explained that it has
"invalidated classifications that burden illegitimate children for the
212. See Law, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 988-98 (cited in note 183) (criticizing the Supreme
Court's failure to distinguish between biological differences and social stereotypes of males and
females).
213. See, for example, Orr, 440 U.S. at 283 (asserting that sex classifications are
unconstitutional when state interests are equally served by a gender-neutral application of the
law).
214. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99 (1987) (ruling that Missouri's marriage
regulation aimed at rehabilitating female prisoners is paternalistic and unconstitutional).
215. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830-31 (joint opinion) (holding a spousal notice requirement
for abortion unconstitutional).
One might argue, however, that state paternalism is appropriate for the teenage targets of
welfare reform, however out of place it may be with respect to adult women. But even for young
women, childbearing decisions are constitutionally protected, compelling states to let mature
minors make their own abortion decisions, for example. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644
(1979) (plurality opinion) (establishing that a pregnant minor is entitled to show she is
sufficiently mature to choose abortion). Indeed, the Court's opinions suggest even greater
constitutional protection for a minor's decision to bear a child than to terminate a pregnancy.
See Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitution and the Anomaly of the PregnantTeenager, 24 Ariz.
L. Rev. 553, 594-96 (1982). Further, a number of state statutes give minors the same ability as
adults to consent to medical treatment in connection with pregnancy and childbirth, excluding
abortion. See, for example, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 431.061(4)(a) (1994).
Recent studies show that adult males father at least half of the children born to teenage
mothers. Jennifer Steinhauer, Study Cites Adult Males for Most Teen-Age Births, N.Y. Times
A1O (Aug. 2, 1995) (discussing a national study by the Alan Guttmacher Institute). Such demographic data suggest that official efforts to reduce the teenage birth rate ought to include these
males who are committing statutory rape or child sexual abuse. The Senate's welfare reform
bill expresses the "sense of the Senate that States and local jurisdictions should aggressively
enforce statutory rape laws," H.R. 4 § 1309 (cited in note 15), an approach followed by the
conference report, 141 Cong. Rec. at H15391 (daily ed. Dec. 26, 1995) (H.R. 4 § 1107).
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sake of punishing the illicit relations of their parents, because
'visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and
unjust.' "216 The Court has reached such results by subjecting these
classifications to an intermediate scrutiny similar to that applied to
It has used this same approach
gender-based classifications.217
whether the state actively burdened illegitimate children or simply
failed to afford them a benefit granted to others.2 8
The Court has clearly stated in these cases that a state's interest in molding the behavior of adults cannot justify discrimination
against their children. Thus, state promotion of marital families and
deterrence of illegitimacy cannot justify the differential treatment of
legitimate and illegitimate children. 219 Similar convictions about the
unfairness of using children to influence parental behavior led the
Court in Plyler v. Doe220 to hold unconstitutional a state's attempt to
discourage illegal immigration by excluding undocumented, alien
children from public school. In this context, however, the Court
stopped short of applying articulated strict or intermediate scrutiny
because illegal-alien status-unlike race, sex, and illegitimacy at
birth-is not an immutable characteristic. 221 Nonetheless, even if
alien status can be changed, the Court noted that children cannot do
so themselves.222 In the end, the Court emphasized that the invalidated law had disadvantaged innocent children based on a situation
beyond their control, in violation of the central tenet of the illegitimacy cases, 223 and applied a more searching standard than rational224
basis review.
Many proposed welfare reforms warrant heightened scrutiny
because they pressure parents by withholding benefits from their

216. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
217. "To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially
related to an important governmental objective." Clark, 486 U.S. at 461. See note 179 and
accompanying text.
218. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 632 (1974) (applying this approach to
restrictions on entitlement to Social Security disability benefits); New Jersey Welfare Rights
Organizationv. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 620-21 (1973) (finding an equal protection violation in the
marital-status restrictions on eligibility for family assistance for the working poor).
219. See, for example, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768-70 (1977).
220. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
221. Id. at 218-22.
222. Id. at 219-220, 223. Compare Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 1985)
(showing how a minor successfully sought asylum in the U.S. despite his parents' objections).
223. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (quoting Weber, 406 U.S. at 175).
224. Id. at 216. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown
of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 Ohio St. L. J. 161, 165-66, 178-80 (1984) (commenting on the
standard of review used in Plyler).
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children. For example, eliminating assistance when an unmarried
teenager has a baby threatens the baby's well-being in an effort to
Similarly, read
discourage the teenager's underlying behavior.
against the background of these precedents, so-called family caps earn
the more accurate title, "child exclusions. ' '225 As the plaintiffs in C.K.
argued, a true family cap, for example, the monetary ceiling on
welfare benefits upheld in Dandridge v. Williams,226 imposes a maxi-

mum grant limitation applicable to all families that reach a specified
size, whatever the family's need and without regard to a mother's
AFDC status at the time of any particular child's conception or birth.
It is "a dollar maximum, not a number of children maximum. ' 227 In
contrast, today's proposed limitations-including the mandatory
provision in the House bill-exclude all children born under particular parental circumstances, such as AFDC status, maternal age, or
marital status.228 The measure now in effect in New Jersey is illustrative because it "eliminates the standard AFDC grant increase (for
example, $102 for a second child and $64 for a third child) for any
child conceived by and born to an AFDC recipient. ' 229 This measure
denies new children benefits on the basis of a parent's AFDC status
rather than capping benefits once they reach a specified level. In
other words, a child exclusion "focuses solely on the status of each
individual child at conception and birth," targeting particular children
and excluding them from the AFDC program "regardless of the total
size of the grant the family receives."23o These reforms seek to deter
225. This is the term used by advocates who oppose the enactment of such measures or who
have challenged them once enacted. For example, the Reproductive Freedom Project of the
American Civil Liberties Union has explained:
By "child exclusion" proposals, we mean any governmental legislation or regulation that
denies a child public benefits to meet basic human needs on the ground that: 1) the
child was conceived or born while the family was already receiving welfare; 2) the child's
mother was not married or was under the age of eighteen when the child was born; 3)
the child's mother is under the age of eighteen and does not reside with her parents; or
4) the child's paternity is not established.
ACLU, Reproductive Rights Update 1 (April 1995). See also Brief in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment at 3 (cited in note 132) (using the term to describe a provision in
New Jersey's Family Development Program, which eliminates the standard AFDC grant
increase for any child conceived by and born to an AFDC recipient).
226. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
227. Brief in Opposition to Federal Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 6-7
(cited in note 132).
228. See H.R. 4 § 101 (cited in note 9) (replacement for § 405 of the Social Security Act).
229. C.K., 883 F. Supp. at 999. See also id. at 999 n.2 (providing the text of the statute).
230. Brief in Opposition to Federal Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 7 (cited
in note 132). Under the New Jersey legislation challenged in C.K., the only exception that the
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welfare mothers, in particular unmarried teenagers, from having children. 231 Just as in the illegitimacy cases and Plyler, the state is discriminating against these excluded children in order to modify the
23 2
behavior of their parents.
In upholding the New Jersey legislation against an equal
protection challenge, the court in C.K. rejected the name "child
exclusion" in favor of "family cap. ' 233 It justified this choice of
terminology by observing that "no child is excluded from benefits;
rather, the additional child born to the AFDC recipient household
simply partakes of the assistance already received by that household
at the same monetary level. '' 234 Disclaiming the analogy to the
illegitimacy cases and Plyler, the court likened the provision to that
upheld in Dandridge on the ground that both simply result in a
smaller per capita share of benefits for children in families covered by
the respective rules. The Court observed that this reasoning makes
the conclusion that the newest child is excluded no more accurate
235
than the conclusion that the first child's grant has been withdrawn.
According to the court, families affected by each provision will simply
236
share the limited benefits that the unit does receive.
Underlying this characterization of New Jersey's reform is an
appeal to equity: the assumption that it equalizes the situations of
welfare families and other families, who receive no automatic increase
in income with the birth of an additional child. 237 Also underlying this
characterization is the court's express refusal to see the measure as a
238
"'behavior-modification' statute[ ] that penalize[s] children."
child exclusion recognizes is 'Tor the children of new AFDC applicants born within ten months of
their families' application for benefits. N.JA.C. 10:82-1.11(a)2." 883 F. Supp. at 1001.
231. See notes 9-35 and accompanying text.
232. Moreover, it is doing so in situations that lie beyond parental control as well, as when
a pregnancy and birth result from rape or incest or when a pregnancy produces multiple births.
See Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 11-12, n.14 (cited in note
132). The House bill's prohibitions on assistance for out-of-wedlock births to minors and on
additional assistance for children born to welfare families contain exceptions for children born
as the result of rape or incest, H.R. 4 § 101 (cited in note 9) (replacement for § 405 of the Social
Security Act), an approach followed by the conference report, 141 Cong. Rec. at H15323 (daily
ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (H.R. 4 § 103) (replacement for § 408 of the Social Security Act).
233. 883 F. Supp. at 1010.
234. Id. See also id. at 1013 (stating that the law permits a child to share a "capped" family
income).
235. Id. at 1010 (quoting Dandridge,397 U.S. at 477-78).
236. Id. at 1010.
237. Id. at 1013-14. See also Minow, 26 Conn. L. Rev. at 826-31 (cited in note 5); Murray,
Losing Ground at 231 (cited in note 37) ("Why should the [welfare] mother be exempted by the
system from the pressures that must affect everyone else's decision to work?').
238. C.K., 883 F. Supp. at 1013. The court stated:
[R]eliance on the [illegitimacy cases and Plyler v. Doe] is unavailing here because the
Family Cap is not an example of a state's attempt to influence the behavior of men and
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But writing this statement does not make it so, especially in an
opinion that then sought to justify New Jersey's law on precisely the
behavior-modification grounds purportedly rejected. Thus, the court
listed among the law's purposes "the reasoned legislative determination that a ceiling on benefits provides an incentive for parents to
leave the welfare rolls for the work force"239 and the fact that "it cannot be gainsaid that the Family Cap sends a message that recipients
should consider the static level of their welfare benefits before having
another child, a message that may reasonably have an ameliorative
effect on the rate of out-of-wedlock births that only foster the familial
instability and crushing cycle of poverty currently plaguing the welfare class.' ' 240 Further, by proceeding to rely on the abortion-funding
cases, 241 the C.K. court necessarily embraced the behavior-modification rationale at the core of those precedents. 242 Given such reasoning, the court was disingenuous when it rejected the applicability of
Plyler and the illegitimacy cases on the ground that the state is not
trying to change the behavior of parents by disadvantaging their children.
The C.K. court's analysis suffers from additional weaknesses
that ultimately compel a closer look at Dandridge itself. First,
Dandridge cannot provide persuasive authority precisely because it
upheld a family cap, not a child exclusion. While, under Dandridge,
large families may have had to share the same size AFDC grant as
smaller families, modern welfare reforms may provide nothing to
share.243 And although Dandridge was litigated on equal protection
grounds, the upheld law treated all similarly situated families alike,

women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relationships.
The legislation here does not direct the onus of parental conduct against the child, nor
does it completely deprive children of benefits which they might otherwise receive but
for the conduct of their parents. Rather, New Jersey's cap merely imposes a ceiling on
the benefits accorded an AFDC household while permitting any additional child to share
in that "capped" family income. Accordingly, this case is simply not within the ambit of
Plyler and its forefathers, which found "behavior-modification" statutes that penalized
children to be irrational.
Id.
239. Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. See id. at 1014-15 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. 173, and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980)). The court invoked these cases in support of its rejection of the plaintiffs' arguments
that the New Jersey law unconstitutionally interferes with private reproductive decisions.
242. See notes 106-07 and accompanying text. The court's reliance on Dandridge,with its
own language of incentives, 397 U.S. at 484, 486, reinforces this conclusion.
243. Withholding all assistance from unmarried teenage parents, see note 14 and accompanying text, provides an example.
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increasing grants with the birth of additional children but finally
capping assistance uniformly at $240 to $250 per month.2 " Thus, the
constitutional problems presented in Dandridge look more like the
issues of substantive due process later resolved in the abortion245
funding cases.
By contrast, child exclusions do raise equal protection questions because they discriminate among families of identical size and
need, based on factors such as welfare status or maternal age, with
consequent unequal treatment for the children of the different families.246

For example, under a true family cap all three-child families

receive the same size grant. Under a child exclusion like New
Jersey's or the House of Representatives', however, a welfare family
with three children on the effective date will continue to receive agrant based on the calculated per capita needs of a group of that size
while another family with two children at that time will receive no
additional allotment for a third child subsequently born, regardless of
need. 247

Children in the second family are disadvantaged-either

because the third child receives nothing or because all three must
share a grant calculated to meet the needs of a two-child family.
Second, despite the intuitive pull of the C.K. court's appeal to
equity, 248 the comparison between welfare and other families defies

such simplistic generalizations.

The benefits of a family newly

applying for AFDC are not limited by the family cap. 24 9 Further, the

fact that New Jersey law allows such families to get benefits for
children born within ten months of the AFDC application2o puts nonwelfare families expecting an additional child in a wholly different
position than their welfare counterparts. Only the former have a
financial cushion measured on the basis of the usual subsistence
244. See 397 U.S. at 473-75.
245. By imposing a limit once a family reaches a particular size, the state in Dandridge,in

effect, refused to subsidize additional children beyond this limit. Conceptualizing Dandridge as
the Court's validation of a state's refusal to subsidize personal choices about procreation and
family size reveals its similarity to the abortion-funding cases. See notes 89-109 and
accompanying text. The equal protection issue arises because individual children in large
families receive a smaller grant than their counterparts in small families, assuming each family
shares the grant among all the children. See Dandridge,397 U.S. at 477-78.
246. C.K.'s assertion that the New Jersey law can be described as an exclusion of the first
child, as accurately as it can be described as an exclusion of the newest child (borrowed from
Dandridge,397 U.S. at 477), does not diminish the implications of the label "child exclusion." It
simply redirects those implications to a different child, equally penalized for parental behavior
over which the child has no control.
247. See C.K., 883 F. Supp. at 999-1000.
248. See note 237 and accompanying text.
249. See Barksdale, 14 L. & Ineq. J. at 4 (cited in note 133) (making this comparison).
250. See note 230 and accompanying text.
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formula, not the new "welfare disincentive.251 As one consequence of
this disparity, non-welfare families anticipating a birth do not
experience a state-created incentive for abortion that the child
exclusion imposes on welfare families. 252 The Court understandably

ignored this factor in deciding Dandridge in 1970, three years before

253
Roe v. Wade brought legalized abortion to most of the United States.

Given the change in abortion law worked by Roe and the
Court's recent sensitivity to disadvantages imposed on children in
response to the choices and behaviors of their parents, as expressed in
Plyler, Dandridgearguably merits reconsideration. Today the family
cap upheld in Dandridge would operate as an incentive for abortion.
Further, it would leave some children with smaller grants than
others, solely because of parental decisions about family size. To say
that several children can share a grant calculated to support a
smaller number provides a no more satisfactory answer than to say
that several illegal alien children can take turns attending school,
sharing a single education. 2-

If Plyler stands for the proposition that

a classification otherwise not evoking heightened scrutiny nonetheless
violates the Equal Protection Clause when it denies a benefit to
blameless children, 255 then Dandridge'sclassification according to the
size of a child's family presents a more difficult question than the
Court acknowledged at the time.2 6 But even if the Supreme Court

would still decide Dandridge as it did in 1970, its family cap is
distinguishable from today's child exclusions for all the reasons
examined above.
251. In some states, however, the child support guidelines (used to calculate the amount a
noncustodial parent must pay to support his or her children) give priority to the children of the
obligor's first marriage, with subsequent children forced to divide what is left. See Feltman v.
Feltman, 434 N.W.2d 590 (S.D. 1989) (upholding the state's support priority for children of the
obligor-parent's first marriage under the rational-basis test). One could argue that these
schemes "penalize" subsequent children for their parents' choices.
252. See Kathleen Best and Tim Poor, Abortion Will Play Role in Battle Over Welfare
Reform, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 5B (March 19, 1995); Tamar Lewin, Abortion Foes Worry About
Welfare Cutoffs, N.Y. Times § 4 at 4 (March 19, 1995); Iver Peterson, Abortions Up Slightly for
Welfare Mothers, N.Y. Times B7 (May 17, 1995) (reporting after the adoption of New Jersey's
family cap); Cheryl Wetzstein, Abortion Tops "FamilyCap"Debate: Policy Fearedas Coercion to
End Pregnancy,Washington Times A6 (May 1, 1995).
253. A few states had decriminalized all early abortions before Roe, but Maryland (the state
in Dandridge)was not one of them. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Abortion, in Sanford H. Kadish
ed., 1 The Encyclopedia of Crime andJustice 4 (Free Press, 1983).
254. That is, even if the children in Plylerhad not suffered a total deprivation of education,
the Court's reasoning would have yielded the same result.
255. See notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
256. But see Bogle, 94 Colum. L. Rev. at 238-39 (cited in note 115) (arguing that
Dandridge'sfamily cap is not "unconscionable").
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B. Revisiting the Abortion-FundingCases and Refining the UndueBurden Test
1. Reasons to Distinguish Welfare Reforms from Abortion Funding
The preceding arguments that welfare reforms trigger elevated
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause are not free from
difficulty, and their acceptance concededly will require stretching, but
certainly not shattering, the existing doctrinal boundaries of race, sex,
and birth-status discrimination. Nevertheless, these arguments
reveal some promising constitutional challenges to privacy-invading
welfare reforms based on equal protection analysis. Thus, challengers
should continue to raise equal protection claims because courts might
adopt such arguments by slightly extending, but not overturning,
controlling precedents. In the end, however, reliance on the Equal
Protection Clause, albeit an advisable strategic move, blinks at two
important weaknesses.
First, as a practical matter legislatures could rewrite welfare
reforms to remove the appearance of discrimination, perhaps
persuading a court that any remaining inequality is simply one of
disproportionate effect. For example, in contrast to the House bill,
with its recitations of racially specific data, the Senate bill and
conference report present statistics without regard to race.257 New
Jersey's Family Development Program legislation, phrased in genderneutral terms about parenting, did not evoke a sex-discrimination
challenge, 258 although it undoubtedly affects mothers more than

fathers. Accordingly, plans currently aimed at teenage mothers might
be insulated from sex-discrimination challenges by similar attention
to language, 25 9 depending upon the courts' receptivity to arguments

about underlying stereotypes and historical discrimination.
(Of
course, with reducing both illegitimacy and welfare dependence as
explicit and central objectives of proposed reforms,26° legislators will
find disguising classifications based on birth status a much more

257. Compare H.R. 4 § 101 (cited in note 15) (replacement for § 406 of the Social Security
Act); 141 Cong. Rec. at H15319 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (H.R. 4 § 101).
258. See C.K., 883 F. Supp. at 999 n.2.
259. Although Rep. Talent of Missouri has orally advocated welfare cutoffs to teenage
mothers, see note 198, in writing he carefully uses gender-neutral words. See James M. Talent,
End Incentives for Teen-Age Parents, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 3B (Jan. 8, 1995) (providing an
editorial commentary).
260. See, for example, note 10 and accompanying text.
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difficult feat-a point that adds considerable force to this particular
equal protection argument.)
Second, as the prior observations suggest, equal protection
attacks on privacy-invading welfare reforms remain an "end run"
around the real problem: the abortion-funding cases' approval of
state efforts to dictate private behavior through allocations of public
funds. Consequently, arguments that welfare reforms interfere with
private reproductive choice, however compelling, cannot prevail without a substantial reexamination of the abortion-funding cases. 261 The
analysis that follows attempts such reexamination, based on the
Justices' more recent elaborations of the undue-burden test, a test
262
previously articulated in the abortion-funding cases.
It is tempting to recite once again why the abortion-funding
cases should have come out the other way, as many critics wrote in
response to the Court's holdings. 263 Unless Justice Ginsburg persuades a majority of the Court that all unfavorable treatment of abortion amounts to unconstitutional sex discrimination, 264 however, these
holdings are here to stay, a conclusion reinforced by the Court's continuing reliance on them. 265 As a result, any effort to loosen their grip

on the emerging challenges to welfare reform probably should accept
these precedents as a given.
Establishing this starting point, however, does not require
ignoring the contrasting political impacts these precedents have in
their original context and in the context of welfare reform. For critics
of Roe v. Wade and its successors, the abortion-funding holdings signalled a welcome limit to abortion rights, a victory for those seeking
261. The plaintiffs in C.K. unsuccessfully sought to distinguish the abortion-funding cases.
In addition to the arguments summarized in note 133, they also claimed that the state's interest
in deterring childbirth "is significantly less than the governmental interest in protecting
potential life at issue in both [McRae] and Maher." Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment at 58 (cited in note 132).
262. See notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
263. See, for example, Perry, 32 Stan. L. Rev. at 1113 (cited in note 104); Laurence H.
Tribe, Commentary: The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative
Duties,and the Dilemma ofDependence, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 330 (1985).
264. See note 185 and accompanying text. Justice Ginsburg has written that the abortionfunding cases may have had a different outcome if the Court had acknowledged the genderdiscrimination issues posed by these funding restrictions. Ginsburg, 63 N.C. L. Rev. at 385
(cited in note 185). Compare DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Intl. Development, 887
F.2d 275, 299, 304-05 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (delineating the scope of the abortion-funding cases).
265. See generally DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189; Rust, 500 U.S. 173. But see Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2518-19, 132 L. Ed. 2d 700
(1995) (distinguishing Rust), discussed in notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
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to curb abortion freedom through whatever avenue the Court might
make available. Many of today's proposed welfare reforms, however,
face opposition from precisely the same quarters because of the tendency of these reforms to encourage abortion. 2 6 According to these

opponents, governmental refusals to support new children operate as
a financial incentive to terminate existing pregnancies.267 Perhaps the
specter of state-induced abortions reveals serious tension between
individual privacy and governmental influence, a tension which the
peculiar politics of abortion funding kept hidden. 268
In any event, rationalizing the abortion-funding cases as a
"clean hands" measure for anti-abortion taxpayers 269 fails to offer a
satisfactory parallel justification for modern welfare reforms. Even if
Michael McConnell is correct that serious theoretical difficulties
prevent transforming the private choice of abortion into a matter of
the "general Welfare" supported by tax dollars, 2 0 these problems
evaporate when the funding withheld encompasses subsistence benefits for children.2

71

As McConnell suggests, albeit not in response to

welfare reforms, subsistence for the needy does not provoke charges
equivalent to the cries of "murder" engendered by abortion,272 although members of the public no doubt believe something must be
done to change the welfare system. Further, some may argue that the
right to have a child, endangered by proposed welfare reforms, is even
266. See note 252.
267. As a result, for example, the bill passed by the House allows states to provide vouchers
for childcare services and products even in situations in which the so-called family cap (child
exclusion) or the ban on aid for out-of-wedlock teenage births applies. H.R. 4 § 101 (cited in note
9) (replacement for § 405 of the Social Security Act). The conference report follows this
approach for its family cap. 141 Cong. Rec. at H15323 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (H.R. 4 § 103)
(replacement for § 408 of the Social Security Act). Many anti-abortion activists remain
unsatisfied by these concessions.
268. In other words, perhaps the questions raised by welfare-reform proposals which
explicitly undertake to influence reproductive choice, and thus encourage abortion, will provoke
second thoughts about the Court's approval of reproductive "behavior modification" in the
abortion-funding cases themselves.
269. See McConnell, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 1008-11, 1046-47 (cited in note 101). But see
Tribe, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 339-40 (cited in note 263) (arguing that taxpayers' qualms are
irrelevant).
270. See McConnell, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 1008-09 (cited in note 101).
271. Providing subsistence for poor children is a matter of the "general welfare" just as
providing public schooling is, for example. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213 ("Providing public schools
ranks at the very apex of the function of a State"). Certainly, destitute children who lack basic
necessities of life will have difficulty benefitting from public education.
272. Compare McConnell, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 1009 (cited in note 101) ("For those who
consider abortion to be murder, it is 'sinful and tyrannical' to require them to participate with
their tax dollars"), with id. at 1012 ("Not even the most dedicated proponent of abortion funding
objects to... programs [like AFDC]"); id. at 1046 ("[P]roviding medical assistance at childbirth
is important to the health and safety of the newborn infant, a purpose with which we all agree"
(emphasis added)).
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more inalienable-and hence more protected from manipulations with
3
governmental funds-than the right to abortion.27
Indeed, transplanting the general issue in the abortion-funding
cases to any other substantive due process controversy may well
evoke a very different popular or political reaction. This political
analysis is relevant, not because it assumes that constitutional
adjudication simplistically mirrors popular morality,274 but rather
because it takes note of the fact that in a number of controversial
275
cases the Court has reached results consistent with public opinion.
Accordingly, even if public opinion opposes government-funded
abortions, 276 it seems doubtful that a similar consensus would clearly
develop about other applications of the exclusively negative right
under substantive due process that emerges from reading Roe v. Wade
together with the abortion-funding cases. 277 For example, consider
whether the negative right recognized in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland278 has a positive-right counterpart. All the reasons given
why the government cannot prohibit Inez Moore from sharing her
home with her two grandsons (who are cousins, not brothers) remain
compelling even if the legal question presented had been, not an exclusionary zoning ordinance, but rather an exclusion from a subsidized housing project. If the right recognized in Moore is solely a
negative right, then the government can decline to subsidize even

273. Compare Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 192536 (1987) (exploring the problems of commodification of women's reproductive capacities).
274. But see Michael J. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The
EthicalFunctionof Substantive Due Process,23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 689 (1976).
275. See, for example, Perry, 32 Stan. L. Rev. at 1113 (cited in note 104) (discussing Roe
and public opinion); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 519 n.13 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting a Gallup poll
showing that 46% of U.S. citizens favored in-school education about birth control). Even the
joint opinion in Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, adopts a "middle ground" that comports with the public's
preference for abortion freedom and its discomfort with any perceived casual attitude about
terminating fetal life. See Dworkin, Life's Dominion at 244 n.18 (cited in note 77) (citing polls
following Casey, which reflect the support for legal abortion accompanied by restrictions of the

type upheld in Casey).
276. In the context of health care reform, one recent survey found that 59% of those asked
believed that abortion should not be included in a plan providing medical benefits for
Americans. George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll 110 (Scholarly Resources, 1995) (reporting the
results of a poll on July 1, 1994). Thirty-four percent thought abortion should be included. Id.
A similar poll three weeks later, however, found 48% opposed to coverage of abortion and 44% in
favor. Id. at 121 (poll on July 22, 1994). Whatever the popular consensus, the scholarly consensus has been critical of the abortion-funding cases. See, for example, Perry, 32 Stan. L. Rev. at
1113 (cited in note 104); Tribe, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 330 (cited in note 263). Compare McConnell,
104 Harv. L. Rev. 989 (cited in note 101).
277. See text accompanying note 98.
278. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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279
living arrangements that "slic[e] deeply into the family itself' so
long as it has a rational basis for doing so. Yet the values protected in
Moore are so politically different from those protected in Roe that,
even if the democratic process were to make Ms. Moore choose between public housing and living with both of her grandchildren, the
Court may well have found a violation of substantive due process.
This conclusion rests not just on the sympathetic plight of Ms.
Moore, who sought only to care for her orphaned grandchild, and on
the well-entrenched belief that the extended family epitomizes the
traditional values that define substantive due process; it rests also on
the fact that the Court has not unswervingly adhered to the
distinction between positive and negative rights. Despite subsequent
observations about its limited reach, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v.
Moreno280 is one pre-abortion-funding decision that suggests that the
legislature cannot always decline to subsidize behavior, in this case a
living arrangement, of which it disapproves. 28' More recently, in

279. Id. at 498 (plurality opinion).
280. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
281. Id. at 534-35 (quoting the district court):
For if the constitutional conception of "equal protection of the laws" means anything, it
must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. As a result, "[a]
purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of itself and without reference to
[some independent] considerations in the public interest, justify [the food stamp]
amendment."
As a result of the Court's equal protection holding in Moreno, Congress was required to provide
food stamps, and thus to support "hippie communes," just as it supported other, more
"legitimate," lifestyles. Later, in Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. at 370 n.8., the
Court noted that Moreno merely had applied the usual rational-basis test while disallowing an
illegitimate interest ("discrimination against a politically unpopular group") to serve as the
justification under that standard of review.
Other decisions predating the abortion-funding cases that recognized positive rights include
those guaranteeing access to courts. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding
that the state must furnish counsel to indigent criminal defendants for a single appeal as of
right); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that the state must furnish necessary
records of trial proceedings to indigents for criminal appeals); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971) (holding that the state must waive divorce fees for indigents); Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817 (1977) (holding that prison officials must provide inmates with law libraries and other
assistance for filing legal papers). In the abortion-funding cases, the Court distinguished such
precedents as addressing situations in which the government "monopolizes" access to the
services in question, in contrast to abortion services. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 469-70 n.5; id. at
471 n.6. Compare Webster, 492 U.S. at 510 n.8 (upholding a ban on the use of public facilities
and employees in abortions, but noting that a "different analysis might apply if a particular
State had socialized medicine and all of its hospitals and physicians were publicly funded'). The
abortion-funding cases distinguished still other precedents appearing to recognize a positive
right to life's 'necessities," see Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974)
(holding that a durational residency requirement for indigents' medical assistance burdens the
right to travel in violation of equal protection); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(holding that a durational residency requirement for subsistence benefits burdens the right to
travel in violation of equal protection), by explaining that, unlike the refusal to subsidize
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Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,282 the

Court held that the First Amendment prohibits viewpoint
discrimination in a limited public forum, forcing the state to fund
religious activities on the same terms as other student activities. The
majority expressly rejected the argument that the abortion-funding
cases leave the state university free to allocate its financial support as
it chooses. 28 3 For me, these examples demonstrate that some values
are sufficiently strong to warrant the recognition of positive
constitutional rights;2 the values embodied in Roe v. Wade, however,
happen not to be among them.
The issues posed by welfare reform can be distinguished from
the denial of abortion funding in two other important ways suggested
by the earlier analysis of equal protection. First, AFDC limits and
cutbacks send a much clearer racial message than refusals to
subsidize abortion.25 Second, denying assistance for abortions does
not threaten harm to innocent children the way today's welfare
reforms do.286 Apart from their equal protection consequences, these
abortions, the invalidated laws imposed a penalty on a constitutional right, Maher, 432 U.S. at
474 n.8; McRae, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.
282. 115 S. Ct. 2510, 132 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1995).
283. The case challenged the University's policy of withholding authorization of payments
in support of a student newspaper promoting religious beliefs. In defense of this policy, the
University argued that the First Amendment's protection of free expression confers only a
negative right, citing the abortion-funding cases for the proposition that a state subsidy of one
protected right does not require a state subsidy of analogous counterpart rights. Brief for the
Respondents at 20-21, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct.
2510, 132 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1995). See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Campus Religion Case,
N.Y. Times B7 (March 2, 1995) (describing the University's strategy to rely on the abortionfunding cases, especially Rust v. Sullivan). The University bolstered its argument by claiming
that providing funds to support a religious newspaper would violate the Establishment Clause.
The Court rejected both arguments, explaining, among other things, that in Rust v. Sullivan the
government was promoting its own message through private speakers, while in the instant case
the university was discriminating on the basis of the personal viewpoints of individuals.
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518-19.
284. See generally Peter B. Edelman, A Mandated Minimum Income, Judge Posner, and
the Destruction of the Idea of Law, in Gottlieb, ed., Public Values in ConstitutionalLaw 171
(cited in note 81):
Both the distinction between state action and inaction and the distinction between positive and negative rights are artificial and misleading. The real question is not whether
there is a legislative outcome, but whether the minority coming to court is identifying a
public value (again, in Hohfeldian terms, a value involving a correlative right) that is
not outweighed by a public value asserted by the majority.
Id. at 187.
285. See notes 156-78 and accompanying text. See also Lawrence, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 378
(cited in note 172) (claiming that it is more difficult to show unconscious race discrimination in
Harrisv. McRae than in Dandridgev. Williams or Jefferson v. Hackney).
286. See notes 216-32, 255 and accompanying text. Constitutional protection for such
innocent children is the essence of Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202.
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distinctions support a more rigorous standard of review for welfare
reforms under substantive due process than the test used in the
abortion-funding cases, even if those precedents must remain
287
undisturbed.
The governmental interests at stake in welfare reform also
differ from those in the abortion-funding cases. These interests include conserving public funds, decreasing the birth rate for welfaredependent and illegitimate children, and expressing preferences for
the marital family and personal responsibility.288 In the abortionfunding cases, the Court identified "encouraging normal childbirth" as
the state's interest. 289 The Justices have noted the unique features of
the state's interest in potential life.290 These features are absent from
Indeed,
the governmental interests in reforming welfare.
"discouraging normal childbirth" is a central objective of welfare reform, and increased abortion rates are likely to follow. 291 Nonetheless,
whether the balance of distinct interests at stake in welfare reform
favors the individual or the state ultimately depends upon the
applicable standard of constitutional review.
2. The Migration of the Undue-Burden Standard
When the Court upheld subsidies for childbirth but not aborin
Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae because such selective
tion
funding does not constitute "unduly burdensome interference with the
freedom" to have an abortion, 292 it did so on the ground that no interference at all had occurred.293 The Court's finding of no state restriction on abortion, 294 its rejection of an entitlement to funds for an abortion,295 and its conclusion that selective funding "does not impinge on

287. Sometimes the combination of problematic elements will raise the standard of review
or yield a determination of unconstitutionality even though each element standing alone may
not have produced such a result. For example, in Boddie, 401 U.S. 371, the Court found a
violation of due process based on the importance of divorce combined with the impact of the
required filing fee on the poor alone. See also Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374 (finding that a marriage
license restriction violates equal protection, based on wealth classification and the importance of
marriage).
288. See, for example, H.R. 4 § 100 (cited in note 9).
289. Maher,432 U.S. at 478. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 324-25.
290. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817-20 (joint opinion). See also id. at 2807 ("Abortion is a
unique act.., fraught with consequences for others [including society]'.
291. See note 252.
292. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 314 (quoting Maher,432 U.S. at 473-74).
293. See notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
294. McRae, 448 U.S. at 314; Maher,432 U.S. at 474.
295. McRae, 448 U.S. at 317-18.
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the due process liberty" recognized in Roe296 all indicate that the absence of an undue burden followed from the absence of any burden
actively imposed by the state.
In the years since the abortion-funding cases, the Court's doctrine has departed significantly from these principles, however.
Although the abortion-funding cases purported to draw a bright line
between state action and passivity, some of the Justices soon relied on
the asserted absence of an undue burden when confronting actively
imposed abortion restrictions falling short of a complete ban-that is,
restrictions erecting surmountable obstacles to abortion. The opinions written by Justice O'Connor, who joined the Court after the abortion-funding cases, have consistently pursued this approach, effecting
several substantial changes in how to determine when there is no
undue burden on the right to abortion.
In 1983, quoting Maher v. Roe, Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health297 explained that the
right to choose abortion protects the woman only from "unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom" to choose an abortion.298
In its 1983 incarnation, Justice O'Connor's undue-burden test served
as a threshold for strict judicial scrutiny, with less burdensome
interferences evoking only rational-basis review. 299 The opinion
justified the test by noting the uniquely "qualified" nature of the right
to abortion 3° and supported the test's application by references to the
abortion-funding cases and cases outside the abortion realm
altogether. 301 Under this test, Justice O'Connor, considering primarily
cost and availability, would have upheld the hospitalization, detailed
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 318. See Appleton, 81 Colum. L. Rev. at 721 (cited in note 98).
462 U.S. 416 (1983).
See id. at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by White and Rehnquist, JJ.).
See id. at 461-63.

300. See id. at 463-64.
301. See id. at 461 n.8, 464 (relying on Maher and McRae); id. at 462-63 (citing cases on

school finance, first amendment rights, and contraception). Justice O'Connor also relied on
cases establishing the governing standard for restrictions on abortion freedom for minors. See
id. at 461-62 n.8. Though these cases have used the language of "undue burdens," see Bellotti v.
Baird,428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (Bellotti 1); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979) (BellottiII)
(plurality opinion), I do not read these cases as exemplifying a general 'migration" of the undueburden standard used in the abortion-funding cases. Indeed, Bellotti I preceded the first round
of funding cases. More importantly, as Bellotti 11 persuasively outlines, there are a number of
special considerations raised by freedom of choice for minors that might merit a different
standard of review than that applicable to restrictions on abortions for adult women. See, for
example, Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 633-39. See also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830 (joint opinion)
(stating that the assumption that minors will benefit from parental consultation offers no
parallel assumption for requiring adult women to notify their husbands).
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informed-consent, and waiting-period requirements struck down by
the majority because each constituted something less than an undue
burden.30 2 Accordingly, no undue burden exists so long as abortions

remain available, although at an increased cost. 303 And without an
undue burden, such laws must satisfy only the rational-basis test,
3°4
which Justice O'Connor found satisfied.
Justice O'Connor elaborated on this approach, in her 1986
dissent in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists.305 Relying on her earlier language, she explained that

"[an undue burden will generally be found 'in situations involving
absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision,' not
wherever a state regulation 'may "inhibit" abortions to some degree.' "306 Again, attempting to display the undue-burden test's credentials, Justice O'Connor invoked the abortion-funding cases. 307 And
again, she relied on these cases to support actively imposed
restrictions on abortions, such as a detailed informed-consent
requirement, in contrast to a passive failure to subsidize.308
Three years later, in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,309 Justice O'Connor formed part of a majority that upheld a

Missouri law prohibiting the use of public facilities and the participation of public employees in abortions not necessary to save the
woman's life.310 This majority found the issue indistinguishable from
that in Maher and McRae, reasoning that, like public funds, public
facilities and employees are public resources and thus withholding
them does not burden the right to abortion.311 Justice O'Connor,
however, also voted to uphold Missouri's actively imposed
requirement of viability testing before terminations of certain
pregnancies, on the ground that such tests usually do not impose an
undue burden on a woman's abortion decision.312 Indeed, because the
302. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 466-67, 470-74.
303. See id. at 466.
304. See id. at 467 (maintaining that hospitalization rationally ensures health and welfare);
id. at 472 (concluding that informed consent attempts to ensure knowing abortion decisions).
305. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
306. Id. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.) (quoting Akron, 462 U.S.
at 464). Justice O'Connor added that even undue burdens on abortion, once subjected to the
compelling-state-interest test, might survive such strict scrutiny. 476 U.S. at 828.
307. 476 U.S. at 828 (citingMcRae, Maher,and Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977)).
308. See Thornburgh,476 U.S. at 830-31.
309. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
310. Id. at 507-11 (opinion of the Court). See id. at 523-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
311. Id. at 510.
312. Id. at 530 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The requirement applied to all pregnancies
reasonably believed to have reached a stage of gestation of twenty weeks or more. See id. at 500

(quoting the statute).
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required tests would only marginally increase the cost of abortions,
she classified them as even less burdensome than the hospitalization
requirement she would have upheld in Akron. 313
In 1992, Justice O'Connor found two co-authors in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.314 The joint opinion of Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter assessed a series of Pennsylvania abortion restrictions under an undue-burden test differing in several important
respects from the version used either in the abortion-funding cases or
in Justice O'Connor's previous opinions. As applied in Casey, the
undue-burden test operates not as a threshold for strict scrutiny, but
as an expression of the ultimate balance between individual abortion
rights and conflicting state interests: a law that imposes an undue
burden on abortion liberty is unwarranted, that is, unconstitutional. 315
As Alan Brownstein has observed, the joint opinion in Casey
transforms the undue-burden test from "a threshold inquiry to
determine the appropriate standard of review," to "an independent
standard of review. '3 6 It is a balance that, while favoring the
government more than the balance fashioned in Roe v. Wade, 17
nevertheless offers more hope to challengers than traditional rational318
basis review.
Despite the transformation of the undue-burden test in Casey,
the joint opinion prominently cited and relied upon the abortionfunding cases (and Justice O'Connor's earlier dissents) as evidence of
the test's established history and accepted use. 319 Tracing this
language trail failed to persuade either Chief Justice Rehnquist or

313. See id. Justice O'Connor's analysis in Webster does not clearly state whether she
continues to see the undue-burden standard as only a threshold issue. The citation to her Akron
dissent, however, suggests that she was adhering to the view that she expressed in 1983.
Compare notes 315-16 and accompanying text (discussing how the operation of the test changes

in Casey).
314. 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992).
315. See id. at 2820-21. The opinion noted and then attempted to clarify inconsistencies
with previous explanations of this test. Id.
316. Brownstein, 45 Hastings L. J. at 879 (cited in note 137).
317. The joint opinion explained that the undue-burden standard achieves a truer balance
between individual and state interests than did Roe's trimester formula, which rests on an
inherent contradiction by recognizing the state's interest in potential life throughout pregnancy
while confining the state's efforts to advance that interest to the brief period after viability.
Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2820.
318. Four Justices in Casey have applied rational-basis review to all abortion restrictions.
See id. at 2867 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by White,
Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.) ("States may regulate abortion procedures in ways rationally related to
a legitimate state interest").
319. Id. at 2819 (quoting Maher v. Roe and citing, among others, Harrisv. McRae).
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Justice Scalia, however. The former condemned the undue-burden
test as "created largely out of whole cloth by the authors of the joint
opinion,320 and the latter called it "a unique concept created specially
for this case."321

But, beyond the question of ancestry, what is an undue burden
under Casey, and how does one differ from a "due" burden? The joint
opinion stated:
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this
purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the
interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice,
not hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering the interest in potential
life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman's choice
cannot be considered a permissible
3 22
means of serving its legitimate ends.

As applied in Casey, the undue-burden test led the joint opinion writers to validate Pennsylvania's definition of medical emergency
and its actively imposed requirements for detailed informed consent,
323
a twenty-four-hour waiting period, recordkeeping, and reporting.
320. Id. at 2866 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
321. Id. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Professor Brownstein rejects such criticisms, contending that the Court has used the undueburden test in one form or another in a wide variety of contexts for the last forty years. See
Brownstein, 45 Hastings L. J. at 872 (cited in note 137). Although I am not entirely convinced
by his thesis, some pre-Casey analyses stand out as possible precursors of the undue-burden
test. See, for example, Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386 ("[Rleasonable regulations that do not
significantly interfere with decisions to enter the marital relationship may legitimately be
imposed") (citing Califano, 434 U.S. at 55 n.12); id. at 388 (noting that when a statutory
classification significantly interferes with a fundamental right, here the right to marry, it must
be "supported by sufficiently important state interests" and "closely tailored to effectuate only
those interests"). Nonetheless, Zablocki's reliance on Jobst, which upheld the termination of a
dependent child's Social Security benefits upon marriage, simply reflects the active/passive
distinction drawn in the abortion-funding cases: substantive due process provides protection
from state-created interference and state-imposed burdens, but the failure to subsidize amounts
to no interference or burden at all. See notes 292-96 and accompanying text. As a result,
Zablocki fails to establish either the proper standard of review for or the outcome of
constitutional challenges to restrictions that, however "slight," represent active or "direct"
interference.
In the end, only the writers of the joint opinion used the undue-burden standard in Casey.
Two Justices, Blackmun and Stevens, voted to maintain conventional strict scrutiny. 112 S.Ct.
at 2841 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that the standard in
Akron and Thornburgh should govern); id. at 2847 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (explaining why Roe's strict scrutiny should govern). Four others, Justices
Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas, would have jettisoned Roe and its demanding standard
of review altogether. See note 318.
322. Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2820.
323. See id. at 2822-26, 2832-33.
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By contrast, the joint opinion found that the spousal-notification
requirement created an undue burden, despite its express exceptions
in cases of feared physical violence against the woman. According to
the joint opinion, the risk of psychological abuse and fear of child
abuse from spouses demonstrated that the requirement was "likely to
prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion.324
The joint opinion is replete with problems. In particular, the
joint opinion fails to explain satisfactorily how the number of women
prevented from obtaining abortions by the spousal-notification provision (an undue burden) exceeds the number prevented by, say, the
waiting period (a due burden). 25 More generally, it makes little sense
to rank a choice as fundamental, for all the reasons eloquently recited
in the joint opinion in Casey,326 and then to authorize governmental

efforts designed to dissuade its exercise.3 27 The affront to equality
inflicted by the gendered nature of an analysis applicable only to
abortion rights exacerbates the problem.32s As Justice Scalia quipped
in dissent, certainly the Court would not permit a twenty-four hour
waiting period for the purchase of religious books on the ground that
this restriction does not unduly burden the First Amendment.29
Whatever the countervailing state interests that make abortion

324. Id. at 2829.
325. The joint opinion's effort to base its assessment of a laws impact on only the group of
women affected by the law, id., does not eliminate the problem. A waiting period could require
more than one visit to the clinic: the first to obtain the state-required information and the
second to obtain the abortion, after the mandated interval. For women living significant distances from the nearest clinic, the burden imposed would be considerable, in terms of travel,
cost, and time away from home. This requirement would likely discourage some women from
having an abortion. But would it constitute an undue burden? After Casey, Justice O'Connor
(joined by Justice Souter) explained that a waiting period could constitute an undue burden if
"in a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial
obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion." Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer,
113 S. Ct. 1668, 1669, 123 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the denial of an
ptpplication for a stay and an injunction) (quoting the joint opinion in Casey). Compare, for
example, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 114 S. Ct. 909, 911-12
(1994) (holding the record in Casey adequate for the joint opinion to apply the undue-burden test
and denying the stay); Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 532 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the North Dakota waiting period does not constitute an undue burden under a
statute read to mandate only one personal visit, because the first contact can be made by
telephone); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 860 F. Supp. 1409, 1420-21 (D.S.D. 1994) (holding
that the South Dakota waiting period does not impose an undue burden).
326. 112 S.Ct. at 2807; id. at 2810-11.
327. See Jane Maslow Cohen, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Deliberative Autonomy and
Abortion, 3 Colum. J. Gender & L. 175, 186-90 (1992) (criticizing the joint opinion's support of
state intervention into the pregnant woman's decision process).
328. See generally id.
329. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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state interests, not limitations on the

right,3 0

nor reductions in the degree of the

state interference with it. Further, as unprincipled and ad hoc as the
Court's undue-burden test for abortion rights appears, 331 applying it
across the board to all fundamental rights would radically change
332
constitutional law and significantly weaken all protected freedoms.
333
In doing so, it would multiply the uncertainties, previewed in Casey,
about precisely which restrictions constitute undue burdens on specific rights.
Although Casey's deeply flawed approach continues to raise
questions, this much is clear. First, the undue-burden test no longer
expresses the difference between state action and state passivity, as it
did in the abortion-funding cases. Second, the new criteria for identifying an undue, and thus unconstitutional, burden focus on a law's
purpose and effects. Third, the test provides an intermediate level of
review, one that is less rigorous than strict scrutiny but also less
deferential than the rational-basis standard.
3. Why the Undue-Burden Standard Should Govern Welfare
Reforms: State Action and Inaction
Critics of the abortion-funding cases have observed that the
Court had difficulty distinguishing state inaction from action in
Maher and McRae because in the "welfare state, '334 the regime of "the

330. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 776 (Stevens, J., concurring) (criticizing Justice White's
treatment of state interests as limitations on definitions of individual liberty); Michael H., 491
U.S. at 145 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (claiming that the plurality erroneously "conflates the
question whether a liberty interest exists" with the state's interest in terminating it). Compare
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807-08 (joint opinion) (asserting that the personal interest at stake is the
same in abortion and contraception cases, and that Roe resolved the issue of whether the state
interest in protecting prenatal life outweighs the personal interest).
331. See notes 300, 320-21 and accompanying text.
332. The damage Casey did to abortion freedom, see, for example, Sylvia A. Law, Abortion
Compromise-Inevitableand Impossible, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 921, would then spread to other
fundamental rights.
Since Casey, some courts have begun to apply the undue-burden test to cases in which
restrictions on other constitutional rights have been perceived to fall short of complete infringements. See, for example, Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 208-10 (Mo. 1993) (holding
that court-ordered grandparent visitation, over the parents' objections in an intact family, does
not impose an undue burden on the parental right to make childrearing decisions); Campbell v.
Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 641-42 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (relying on Casey, upholding a
grandparent visitation statute because it does "not substantially infringe" on parents' rights).
333. See note 325 and accompanying text.
334. See generally, for example, Theodore R. Marmor, Jerry L. Mashaw and Philip L.
Harvey, America's Misunderstood Welfare State: Persistent Myths, Enduring Realities (Basic
Books, 1990).
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new property, '335 government support is so pervasive that a discrete
funding question-whether or not to subsidize abortions-becomes
difficult to isolate from the larger mosaic. 336 Nonetheless, the Court
wrote these opinions as if the government's refusal to fund even medically necessary abortions could be analyzed coherently apart from its
provision of other services for Medicaid recipients, including care
incident to continued pregnancy and childbirth. 37
In the context of programs providing general family assistance,
such as AFDC or its block-grant successor, it becomes far more
difficult to distinguish state passivity from state action than in the
context of abortion funding. One could plausibly envision withholding
funds earmarked for a recipient's abortion, while affording her
medical care for carrying her pregnancy to term, as a refusal to
subsidize abortion-that is, inaction--on the part of the state, even if
the woman chooses to divert other funds for an abortion anyhow. The
state provides assistance for certain care, that for childbirth, but not
for its mutually exclusive alternative, abortion.338
In contrast, isn't a governmental refusal to subsidize an additional child just another way of describing a smaller grant for an entire family, with no conceivable mutually exclusive alternatives to
justify a claim of state inaction? This question becomes unavoidable
given the understanding articulated in C.K. that, under New Jersey's
Family Development Program, no child is excluded; rather, welfare
families with new children are expected to share their capped grants
among a larger number of family members. 339 Such anticipated sharing necessarily amounts to state support of the same new children for
whom welfare reforms disclaim such action. Ironically, then, acknowledging reforms like New Jersey's as child exclusions, rather
335. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964). Compare generally
William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1431
(1986).
336. These are the critics who have questioned the Court's identification of the complete
absence of governmental medical care as the "baseline" in the abortion-funding cases. See notes
115-16 and accompanying text. See also Edelman, A Mandated Minimum Income, in Gottlieb,
ed., Public Values in ConstitutionalLaw at 186-87 (cited in note 284).
337. See also Appleton, 81 Colum. L. Rev. at 738-40 (cited in note 98) (claiming that the
Court separated the abortion right from the right to procreate in order to conclude that funding
the latter, but not the former, is state inaction).
338. The abortion-funding cases referred specifically to childbirth as an "alternative" to the
abortion sought by an indigent pregnant woman. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474; McRae, 448 U.S. at
325.
339. In essence, this was one of the points the court used to reject the label "child exclusion" and its implications of unconstitutionality for New Jersey's reform. See notes 233-36 and
accompanying text.
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than calling them family caps, would more convincingly support an
argument of state inaction consistent with the abortion-funding cases,
that is, a state refusal to subsidize additional children for welfare
recipients. Yet recognition that such welfare reforms completely
deprive new children of public assistance makes such plans vulnerable under Plyler v. Doe and the illegitimacy cases.30 As a result, in
rejecting the label "child exclusion" in favor of "family cap," C.K. inadvertently weakened the applicability of the abortion-funding cases
while repudiating the plaintiffs' Plyler-basedchallenge.
Similarly, the provision of childcare services and goods, such
as diapers, allowed by the House bill and the conference report,341
reinforces the characterization of the state's role under welfare reform
as one of action with respect to the new children of welfare recipients
and teenage mothers. These illustrations demonstrate that the
problem of indeterminate "baselines" raised in criticism of the
abortion-funding cases proves far more intractable when considering
welfare reforms, because here the state certainly has acted with
respect to particular families and certainly will continue to act, albeit
at a less generous level per person.342 The state action disclosed by
this analysis calls for a higher standard of review than the rationalbasis test triggered by the state inaction described in the abortionfunding cases.
Although other proposed welfare reforms, notably Norplant
bonuses, aim at a discrete behavior and in that way more closely resemble the abortion-funding problem, they too cannot be presented as
a case of state inaction.
Here the proposal goes beyond a
governmental subsidy of Norplant for users, with the state simply
declining to subsidize other methods of birth control or their absence.
Similarly, conditioning assistance for teenage parents on their school
attendance contemplates something other than a subsidy.143 Instead,
these proposals contemplate financial rewards, offered in addition to
the state's provision of Norplant or education free of charge3 44 Simply
put, this is state action.
340. See notes 216-32, 255 and accompanying text.
341. See note 267.
342. See notes 115-16 and accompanying text. "Reformed" welfare schemes present an
even more obvious case of action than the facts of DeShaney, in which critics persuasively have
rejected the majority's description of state inaction. See note 100.
343. See, for example, H.R. 4 § 101 (cited in note 15) (replacement for § 406 of the Social
Security Act); 141 Cong. Rec. at H15323 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (H.R. 4 § 103) (replacement for
§ 408 of the Social Security Act).
344. See David S. Coale, Norplant Bonuses and the UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine,
71 Tex. L. Rev. 189, 208-10 (1992) (showing how a poor woman is "worse off' for exercising the
constitutional right to procreate because she must forego the bonus); Vance, 21 Hastings Const.
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"Bridefare" lends itself to a similar analysis. The abortionfunding cases distinguished state inaction (or a refusal to subsidize)
from a financial penalty, that is, withdrawing support that the pregnant woman would otherwise receive but for her abortion.5 The
financial rewards of bridefare present the mirror image of financial
penalties and, hence, fall outside the doctrinal rubric of the abortionfunding cases, with their emphasis on state passivity.346

Another proposed measure, cutting off assistance to unmarried
teenage mothers who as children themselves had been beneficiaries of
AFDC, meets the criteria for an unconstitutional penalty under the
abortion-funding cases because it would take away existing benefits
from the covered class. 34 7 This step leaves these individuals consider-

ably worse off than if the state merely had declined to provide support
for their new offspring.-

Given these observations, one might argue that these welfare
reforms should evoke the strict scrutiny the Court refused to apply in
the abortion-funding cases. I would support this argument because I
believe the Court should have used strict scrutiny in Maher and
McRae. Confining those holdings to their own narrow context would
at least minimize the damage they could inflict on other facets of the
right to privacy.
Yet, despite the differences between abortion funding and
welfare reforms,349 strict scrutiny for privacy-invading welfare reforms
strikes me as wishful thinking that has only a negligible chance of
L. Q. at 842 (cited in note 182) (distinguishing Norplant bonuses from the state's role in
abortion-funding cases).
345. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474-75 n.8 (stating that the denial of general welfare benefits to
women having abortions would constitute a penalty); McRae, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19 (stating that
withholding all Medicaid benefits from women having abortions would constitute a penalty).
See notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
346. Proposals to terminate all assistance unless the recipient uses Norplant, see Laurence
C. Nolan, The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine and Mandating Norplant for Women on
Welfare Discourse, 3 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 15, 22, n.58 (1994), would clearly impose unconstitutional financial penalties.
347. H.R. 4 § 101 (cited in note 9) (replacement for § 405 of the Social Security Act). This
provision prohibits states from using block grants for "cash benefits for a child born out-ofwedlock to an individual who has not attained 18 years of age, or for the individual, until the
individual attains such age." Id. I read this language to require states to discontinue support
for minors in welfare families when these minors themselves have children out of wedlock.
Thus, they lose their existing benefits, along with the denial of support for their new offspring.
See also 141 Cong. Rec. at H15323-24 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (H.R. 4 § 103) (replacement for §
408 of the Social Security Act).
348. See McConnell, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 1015-17 (cited in note 101) (analyzing what it
means to make one "worse off).
349. See notes 257-91 and accompanying text.
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coming true.3 0 This is so for two reasons, the first a matter of
analysis and the second a matter of prediction. First, and most
importantly, although proposed welfare reforms do not present cases
of pure state inaction, neither do they present paradigm cases of state
action, such as restrictions on reproductive autonomy enforced by
criminal punishment or civil sanctions,351 the typical trigger for strict
judicial scrutiny. Second, the significant evisceration of the right to
privacy accomplished by Casey may well signal the present Court's
reluctance to accord maximum protection to freedoms that a majority
of the Justices must see as lying at the edges of the Constitution.3,52
The same points, however, suggest that it is not unrealistic to
expect the Court to apply something more than rational-basis review
to state manipulations of reproductive choice through the combination
of action and inaction embodied in welfare reform. According to the
abortion-funding cases, "[c]onstitutional concerns are greatest when
the State attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State's power
to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily
far broader. 353 But constitutional concerns do not evaporate when not
at their greatest, and government's broader power to encourage acts
in the public interest certainly has its limits. Under the continuum
suggested by the Court's language, an intermediate standard of review like the undue-burden test 354 may usefully split the difference
between strict scrutiny and rationality review that govern, respectively, state action and inaction encroaching on constitutional rights.
It may also capture the current Court's effort to accommodate state
interests while recognizing what it deems peripheral fundamental
rights.
Alan Brownstein has attempted to show that Casey's undueburden test has played a considerable role in constitutional law for

350. Compare Barksdale, 14 Law & Ineq. J. at 49-69 (cited in note 133) (advocating a
"harms-based test" to make family caps invalid under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
351. See, for example, Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2834, 2837 (reproducing Pennsylvania's abortion
statute, including its penalty provisions, in an appendix).
352. See Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 Colum. J. Gender & L. 119, 127-33
(1992) ('rhe Disappearance of Privacy?"). Compare notes 76-77.
353. McRae, 448 U.S. at 315 (quotingMaher,432 U.S. at 476).
354. Brownstein writes:
An undue burden standard that evaluates both the purpose and effect of
challenged regulations [as in Casey] has support in the case law, but it reflects a threetier model of analysis. Unlike the prior [two-tier] model, this approach provides for an
additional level of scrutiny. In addition to strict scrutiny and minimum rationality
review, there is an intermediate level of scrutiny that usually involves some form of
balancing test.
Brownstein, 45 Hastings L. J. at 909 (cited in note 137).

1996]

WELFARE REFORMS

forty years. 5 5 He examines a number of discrete doctrinal areas,
including cases involving the Establishment Clause and those
interpreting the Takings Clause. 356 Brownstein's analysis, however,
does not address the abortion-funding cases, much less mention
proposals for welfare reform. Nonetheless, some of his observations,
removed from the context he has developed, strengthen the case for
applying the undue-burden test to privacy-invading welfare reforms.
In particular, Brownstein has ventured that a flexible balancing test
like the undue-burden standard better suits the contemporary
"complexity of human society" 357 than a constitutional jurisprudence
based on categorically defined rights, with violations invariably
subject to rigorous review.3 8 In certain areas, he continues, "some
framework of review more sensitive to reasonable regulatory concerns
must be implemented." 359
In contrast to Brownstein, I remain reluctant to depart from
full constitutional protection for all fundamental rights, including the
choices embraced by the right to privacy. The abortion-funding cases
and Casey already have stopped short of that ideal, however. Given
that reality, perhaps Brownstein's suggestion-although meant to
resolve different constitutional questions-may offer a promising,
practical alternative to a scheme in which all allocations of public
funds otherwise seem destined for nothing more than rational-basis
review. This alternative may prove particularly appropriate for
evaluating the entangled threads of the complex welfare system,
either "as we know it" or as drastically reformed. Whether or not
Brownstein has correctly pointed to the complexity of modern society360 in general, the American welfare system unquestionably manifests such complexity, as any AFDC recipient, state eligibility worker,
member of Congress, or reader of the Social Security Act will attest.
Despite the "brutal need361 it was designed to address, everyone
would agree that the system must have some limits, even if there is

355. See generally id.
356. See id. at 903-08.
357. Id. at 956.
358. Id. In Brownstein's words, "Itihe conventional understanding that all conflicts between rights-related activity and state action must be resolved under strict scrutiny review
simply immunizes too large an area of human activity from democratic deliberation and regulation." Id.
359. Id. at 957 (emphasis added). Brownstein's statement addresses freedom of speech.
360. See notes 357-58 and accompanying text.
361. See Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need. Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement, 19601973 at 98 (Yale U., 1993) (providing the history of the phrase).
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vigorous disagreement about what those limits should be.
Transplanted to this new context that he did not explore,
Brownstein's claim that the undue-burden test is a standard properly
"sensitive to reasonable regulatory concerns" makes an even stronger
case for using the test to assess welfare reforms than for applying it
36 2

in Casey itself.

In sum, the undue-burden test may offer a helpful middle
ground for assessing welfare reforms that superficially resemble the
refusal to fund abortion but, on closer inspection, do not comfortably
fit the description of state inaction because of the intricacies of the
larger assistance programs in which these reforms are proposed to
occur.
4. The Undue Burden of Welfare Reforms
The undue-burden test formulated in Casey directs courts to
consider the purpose and effect of a legal rule or governmental decision. Although the joint opinion's language indicates that a law can
fail on the basis of either its purpose or its effect, both elements probably play a role in the application of the test.

63

The joint opinion's

analysis of Pennsylvania's spousal-notification requirement supports
this understanding, because the Justices found constitutional defects
in both the law's purpose and its effects.364 Indeed, if an anti-abortion
purpose alone spelled invalidity, the joint opinion could not have cited
with approval all of Justice O'Connor's previous dissents, which regularly ignored a statute's anti-abortion purposes to focus instead on the
365
absence of an undue burden according to the law's effects.
Further, considering effects alone would make the undue-burden test unnecessarily problematic. This approach would implicate a
wide range of decisions about welfare, including the rejection of wel362. In other words, Pennsylvania's restrictions and their enforcement, examined in Casey,
operate in a comparatively simple and straightforward way. By contrast, the layers of bureaucracy in the administration of AFDC and its proposed successors make Brownstein's "regulatory
concerns" especially pressing.
363. Although the joint opinion in Casey speaks of "purpose or effect" (emphasis added), see
note 322 and accompanying text, the analysis contemplated by the three Justices considers both
elements. See Brownstein, 45 Hastings L. J. at 908 (cited in note 137) (discussing the "complex
inquiry directed at both purpose and effect'.
364. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829 (stating that the requirement is likely to prevent a
significant number of women from obtaining abortions); id. at 2830-31 (finding that the state's
purpose of protecting the husband's interest embodies an impermissible view of women and
marriage, giving the husband authority over his wife's reproductive decisions).
365. Compare, for example, Akron, 462 U.S. at 444 (asserting that much of the informedconsent requirement is "designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to persuade her
to withhold it altogether"), with id. at 472 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (finding no undue burden).
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fare reforms, that have unintended effects and consequences.3 66 For
example, critics claim that existing rules of public assistance
encourage childbearing, though they are not designed for this
purpose. 3 7 If privacy-invading effects alone condemned a rule under
the undue-burden standard, then both the present system and the
proposed reforms would become constitutionally suspect. 368
Government would become paralyzed, and questions about how to
address such problems would become incoherent.
Under Casey, the law's purpose or effect must "plac[e] a substantial obstacle in the path" of the individual's exercise of reproductive choice. 3 9 "Obstacle," like "penalty" or "direct interference," is a
term that traces back to the Court's efforts in the abortion-funding
cases to distinguish state action from inaction.37 Because today's
welfare reforms contemplate far more involvement by the state than a
hands-off stance,371 they cannot summarily survive the undue-burden
test for failure to create an obstacle; rather, they warrant a closer
examination for purposes and effects.
While the abortion-funding cases virtually conceded the antiabortion purposes underlying the selective funding schemes they
upheld, 372 the cases emphasized the absence of any cognizable effect
on the challengers. Indigent women seeking abortions were no worse
off than if the government got out of the Medicaid business altogether.3 73 Further, as the Court observed, these women could find
other means to obtain this discrete and relatively inexpensive service.3 74 By contrast, many welfare reforms threaten ongoing and per-

366. At one time, Congress considered a proposal that would have required a "family
impact statement" before the enactment of any law likely to affect family behavior. See
American Families: Trends and Pressures, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Children and
Youth of the Sen. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1973)
(dialogue between Sen. Walter Mondale and Dr. Edward Zigler).
367. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text. See generally Murray, Losing Ground (cited
in note 37).
368. Thus, the test is not a pure effects test. Compare McConnell, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at
1002 (cited in note 101) (critiquing Professor Sullivan's effects test for unconstitutional
conditions as being too broad).
369. See note 322 and accompanying text.
370. See notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
371. See notes 338-48 and accompanying text.
372. Maher,432 U.S. at 478; McRae, 448 U.S. at 324-25.
373. Maher,432 U.S. at 469,474; McRae, 448 U.S. at 317-18.
374. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474; McRae, 448 U.S. at 314. See Rosalind Pollack Petchesky,
Abortion and Woman's Choice: The State, Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom 160 (Longman,
1984) (asserting that the Hyde Amendment did not deter the majority of poor women from
having legal abortions).
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vasive effects, permeating the conditions of everyday familial life, and
are not confined to an isolated decision.375 The woman who obtains an
unfunded abortion finds herself under financial pressure at that time.
For the woman who has an "unfunded child," the pressure continues
throughout the child's minority. As a result, child exclusions or
family caps, as well as assistance cut-offs for unmarried teenage
mothers, create precarious conditions under which the families in
question must live indefinitely. These conditions deter the exercise of
reproductive autonomy. To the extent these deterrents work, they
36
constitute substantial obstacles under Casey. 7
In addition, the privacy-invading purposes underlying many
proposed reforms have been touted by the decision makers for all the
world to see. The most often expressed purpose of welfare reform, to
77
stop welfare mothers or unmarried teenagers from reproducing,3 is
reflected in every measure or proposal. For example, the House bill
explicitly aims to reduce illegitimate births and seeks to achieve this
goal by rewarding states with increased grants when they reduce outof-wedlock births; a mathematical formula called the "illegitimacy
ratio" measures a state's success. 37 8 The Senate bill contains an
375. Obviously, if an indigent woman seeking an abortion cannot find alternative means to
purchase one, the effect on her life is ongoing and pervasive, whether she rears the child or
resorts to adoption. Roe certainly implies that adoption does not solve the problem of unwanted
pregnancy. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (recognizing the burdens imposed by abortion bans despite
the opportunity to choose adoption). See also Robert D. Goldstein, Mother-Love and Abortion: A
Legal Interpretation54-59 (U. Cal., 1988) (concluding that by banning abortion the state exploits
women, because they will ultimately come to love the children of their unwanted pregnancies).
376. They are unquestionably obstacles because they result from active efforts of the state.
See notes 338-48 and accompanying text.
377. See notes 9-35 and accompanying text.
378. SEC. 403. PAYMENTS TO STATES
(a) Entitlements.(1) Grants for family assistance.(A) In general.Each eligible State shall be entitled to receive from
the Secretary for each of fiscal years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and
2000 a grant in an amount equal to the State family assistance
grant for the fiscal year.
(B) Grant increased to reward states that reduce out-of-wedlock
births.- The amount of the grant payable to a State under subparagraph (A) for fiscal year 1998 or any succeeding fiscal year shall
be increased by(i) 5 percent if the illegitimacy ratio of the State for the fiscal year
is at least 1 percentage point lower than the illegitimacy ratio
of the State for the fiscal year 1995; or
(ii) 10 percent if the illegitimacy ratio of the State for the fiscal
year is at least 2 percentage points lower than the illegitimacy
ratio of the State for fiscal year 1995....
(b) Definitions.- As used in this section: ...
(2) Illegitimacy ratio.- The term 'illegitimacy ratio' means, with respect to
a State and a fiscal year-
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analogous provision, 379 and elements of both versions appear in the
conference report.380 Similarly, New Jersey's Family Development

(A) the sum of(i) the number of out-of-wedlock births that occurred in the State
during the most recent fiscal year for which such information is
available; and
(ii) the amount (if any) by which the number of abortions performed in the State during the most recent fiscal year for which
such information is available exceeds the number of abortions
performed in the State during the fiscal year that immediately
precedes such most recent fiscal year; divided by
(B) the number of births that occurred in the State during the most recent fiscal year for which such information is available....
H.R. 4 § 101 (cited in note 9) (replacement for § 403 of the Social Security Act).
379. (f) Grant Increased To Reward States That Reduce Out-of-Wedlock Births.(1) In general.- The amount of the grant payable to a State under section
403(a)(1)(A) for fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000 shall be increased by(A) an amount equal the product of $25 multiplied by the number of
children in the State in families with incomes below the poverty
line, according to the most recently available census data, if(i) the illegitimacy ratio of the State for the most recent fiscal year
for which such information is available is at least 1 percentage
point lower than the illegitimacy ratio of the State for fiscal
year 1995 (or, if such information is not available, the first
available year after 1995 for which such data is available); and
(ii) the rate of induced pregnancy terminations for the same most
recent fiscal year in the State is not higher than the rate of induced pregnancy terminations in the State for fiscal year 1995
(or, the same first available year); or
(B) an amount equal the product of $50 multiplied by the number of
children in the State in families with incomes below the poverty
line, according to the most recently available census data, if(i) the illegitimacy ratio of the State for the most recent fiscal year
for which information is available is at least 2 percentage
points lower than the illegitimacy ratio of the State for fiscal
year 1995 (or, if such information is not available, the first
available year after 1995 for which such data is available); and
(ii) the rate of induced pregnancy terminations in the State for the
same most recent fiscal year is not higher than the rate of induced pregnancy terminations in the State for the fiscal year
1995 (or, the same first available fiscal year)....
(3) Illegitimacy ratio.For purposes of this subsection, the term
'illegitimacy ratio' means, with respect to a State and a fiscal year(A) the number of out-of-wedlock births that occurred in the State during the most recent fiscal year for which such information is available; divided by
(B) the number of births that occurred in the State during the most recent fiscal year for which such information is available.
H.R. 4 § 101 (cited in note 15) (replacement for § 406 of the Social Security Act).
380. 141 Cong. Rec. at 15370-21 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (H.R. 4 § 103) (replacement for
§ 403 of the Social Security Act) (using the House's 5% and 10% figures, but the Senate's
definition of the illegitimacy ratio and the Senate's denial of rewards to state whose abortion
rates increase). See id. at 15394-96 (comparing the House, Senate, and conference versions).
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Program is undergoing evaluation according to its impact on the fertility rate of covered AFDC recipients, compared to those in a control
group.381 These measurements of the success of welfare reforms fuse
considerations of purpose and effect, clearly disclosing legislative
goals in the assessments of each law's impact.
Under Kathleen Sullivan's interpretation of Casey, the undueburden test's inquiries into purpose and effect coalesce in a determination of an abortion restriction's coercive strength.382 Abortion bans
and laws giving what amounts to veto power to third parties strongly
coerce a woman's choice and thus fail the test, according to this analysis. 38 3 According to Casey, if a husband psychologically abuses his
wife or withdraws his financial support as the result of a law
requiring her to notify him of her abortion plans, then the state has
on the woman as a precondition for the
imposed a palpable cost
3 84
right.
her
of
exercise
Proposed privacy-invading welfare reforms coerce because they
give the state a role like that of the notified husband hypothesized in
Casey's joint opinion to strike down the spousal notification requirement: the man who will use his financial control to impress his will
on his economically dependent wife.385

If the possibility that a

husband will deprive his wife or her children of support creates a
substantial obstacle (an undue burden), then a policy of the state to

381. See Bureau of Economic Research, Rutgers University School of Social Works, The
Family Development Program: An Analysis of Impacts, Costs and Benefits 50 (proposal
submitted to the State of New Jersey) (on file with the Author); Brief in Opposition to Federal
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at Exhibit C (cited in note 132); Telephone
Interview with Dr. Rudy Myers, Assistant Director, State of New Jersey Department of Human
Services, Division of Economic Assistance (Aug. 8, 1995).
382. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards,106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 33-34 (1992). Professor Sullivan emphasizes effects,
at the expense of purpose, explaining that the new standard "takes into account the quantity of
impact on pregnant women." Id. at 34. But see Sullivan, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 1500-01 (cited in
note 102) (arguing that the Court should have decided the abortion-funding cases under a strictscrutiny standard, because of the government's "rights-pressuring intent). Sullivan also
identifies "coercion" as a key element in the Court's unconstitutional conditions cases, while
pointing out the Court's failure to give the term a clear meaning. Id. at 1428-56.
383. See Sullivan, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at 32-34 (cited in note 382). By contrast, laws
requiring a physician to "inform" a woman's choice, just like waiting periods, survive the test
because they ultimately leave the woman free to decide. See id. at 34.
384. See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2829.
385. Id. at 2826 (quoting the district court's finding that exceptions in the notification
requirement would not exempt a woman "whose husband, if notified, would, in her reasonable
belief, threaten to . . . use his control over finances to deprive [her] of necessary monies for
herself or her children"); id. at 2828 ("Many abused women who find temporary refuge in
shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income';
id. at 2829 ("Many [women] may fear devastating forms of psychological abuse from their
husbands, including ...the withdrawal of financial support").
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wield its financial power to influence the reproductive choices of
economically dependent citizens must create such obstacles and
burdens as well. The state's efforts to deter childbearing by
restricting assistance for new children or rewarding the use of
Norplant, just to cite a few examples, embody such financial coercion.
Indeed, the parallel roles of spouse and state in this analysis should
come as no surprise, for historically welfare has served as a "stand-in"
for husbands and fathers to provide single mothers with the "family
wage" enjoyed by their married (and equally economically dependent)
38 6
counterparts.
Casey suggests that undue burdens are those that prevent a
woman from choosing abortion. In other words, they are anti-abortion
legal rules that have a high likelihood of success precisely because
they coerce. Lesser (or due) burdens on the abortion right presumably
leave more women undeterred from their original plan to terminate
their pregnancies; otherwise they would have the effect of creating a
substantial obstacle.387 If the goal of the restrictions upheld in Casey
is not to decrease abortion but rather simply to push women to think
longer and harder about abortion, as the joint opinion intimates,38

386. See Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled at 37-64 (cited in note 39); notes 42, 187-90 and
accompanying text. The point emerges even more clearly in the words of welfare reformer
Johnnie Tillmon Blackston, who compared welfare to a "supersexist marriage." Robert McG.

Thomas, Jr., Johnnie Tillmon Blackston, Welfare Reformer, Dies at 69, N.Y. Times Bl (Nov. 27,
1995). The obituary quotes Blackston as follows:
You trade in "a"man for 'The" man. But you can't divorce him if he treats you bad. He
can divorce you, of course--cut you off-anytime he wants. But in that case "he" keeps
the kids, not you.
'The" Man, the welfare system, controls your
'The" Man runs everything ....
money.
Id.
387. Even if the joint opinion underestimates the impact of the restrictions that it found
constitutional, see Law, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev.at 931 (cited in note 332) (stating that Casey may
represent the "worst of all possible worlds.... [by] allowing the state to adopt measures that
effectively curtail many women's exercise of the abortion right"), unconstitutional restrictions
must have an even greater impact in order to prevent the test from becoming entirely
incoherent.
388. 112 S. Ct. at 2821, 2824. Compare Cohen, 3 Colum. J. Gender & L. at 186-90 (cited in
note 327) (criticizing Casey on this point).
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then the analysis might make theoretical sense, 389 notwithstanding
39
the bottom line in numbers of abortions actually discouraged. 0
Proposed welfare reforms have more concrete and measurable
goals: reducing the number of welfare-dependent children, the illegitimacy rate, and the prevalence of teenage motherhood. Certainly,
most proponents of these reforms seek to accomplish more than additional thinking about these issues by welfare recipients, as documented by formulae designed to assess the legislation's success, such
as the illegitimacy ratio.391
Preliminary data from New Jersey send conflicting signals
about the effectiveness of privacy-invading welfare reforms, with
some studies showing no impact and others indicating reduced birth
rates and increased abortions. 92 Under Casey, welfare reforms powerful enough to achieve goals like reducing particular birth rates are
more likely to earn condemnation as undue burdens than those that
would fall short of such success. That is, Casey paradoxically suggests that the most effective measures face the greatest risk of constitutional invalidity and less effective measures have a better chance of
surviving judicial review. And yet, if they survive scrutiny under the
undue-burden test because they are deemed not sufficiently coercive
to achieve their goal of reducing targeted birth rates, how can welfare
reforms that deny subsistence to the needy, that jeopardize innocent
children, and that seek to inject the government into the most intimate of life's decisions, be anything but undue burdens? Creating
such risks for the poor, without accomplishing the intended ends,
produces harm without justification.

389. To say that the joint opinion's approach might make some theoretical sense does not
mean that it makes practical sense. Requiring women who have visited an abortion clinic or
physician to spend more time thinking about whether or not to terminate a pregnancy pursues

an illusory goal because such women already have decided on abortion. See Susan Frelich
Appleton, Doctors, Patientsand the Constitution: A TheoreticalAnalysis of the Physician'sRole
in "Private"ReproductiveDecisions, 63 Wash. U. L. Q. 183, 201-02 (1985).
390. If the recognized goal were reducing the number of abortions, the joint opinion would
be taking the peculiar position of invalidating the very laws that most effectively achieve this
end. See 112 S. Ct. at 2880 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
under the joint opinion, the state '"may not regulate abortion in such a way as to reduce significantly its incidence"; the joint opinion permits the state to pursue its interest in human life
"only so long as it is not too successful").
391. See notes 378-81 and accompanying text. Nor does the mere expression of "family
values" often linked with the proposed reforms fully reflect the underlying purposes, as these
measurement tools make plain. In any event, standing alone, such official "values" will not
suffice as justifications under any kind of heightened scrutiny. See note 140 and accompanying
text; Davis, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1348 (cited in note 126).
392. See notes 32, 252 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION

Under the "happily-ever-after" conclusion to this Article, privacy-invading welfare reforms will serve as a vehicle for the Supreme
Court to realize it reached the wrong results in the abortion-funding
cases, as well as in Dandridgev. Williams and PlannedParenthoodv.
Casey. Constitutional challenges to welfare reforms would help the
Court belatedly see that official manipulations of reproductive choice,
through funding childbirth but not abortion, intrude on the
fundamental right to privacy protected in a long line of holdings by
strict judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. Challenges
to the proposed reforms would also reveal why Dandridgeerroneously
failed to protect innocent children from the harmful consequences of
state efforts to mold parental behavior, a flaw illuminated by
subsequent illegitimacy cases and Plyler v. Doe. Finally, close
analysis of welfare reforms would force a majority of the Court to
abandon expressly Casey's undue-burden test as both insufficiently
protective of reproductive autonomy and paradoxical in its
understanding of undue burdens.
These fantasies are unlikely to materialize, however, and for
now the abortion-funding cases, Dandridge, and Casey all remain
good law.393 Nonetheless, even under a "down-to-earth" conclusion to
this Article, the prospects for successful constitutional challenges to
proposed privacy-invading welfare reforms, an issue largely absent
from the ongoing debate, are not as bleak as these precedents might
suggest. The continued validity of the abortion-funding cases does not
require extending them to welfare reforms. Several different kinds of
discrimination addressed by the equal protection guarantee set
welfare reforms apart from the funding schemes upheld in those
precedents. In addition, the unique politics of abortion also supply
reasons to distinguish the abortion-funding cases from the current
controversy. Similarly, Dandridge's family cap can be distinguished
Finally, despite all of Casey's
from today's child exclusions.
difficulties, it may be put to good use by providing an intermediate
standard of review well suited for the "state inaction plus action"
characteristic of welfare reforms. The test's intermediate scrutiny

393. Of course, "good law" is an overstatement with respect to Casey'sjoint opinion, which
simply embodies the lowest common denominator that would produce a holding in the case. The
point, however, is that no subsequent case has set Casey aside, and lower courts have relied on
its undue-burden test. See notes 314, 325, 332 and accompanying text.
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also serves the perceived need to consider the intricacies and
regulatory interests presented by the contemporary welfare system.
By so deploying the undue-burden test, the courts may begin to create
a constitutional foundation for a more unified system of family law,
one in which poverty does not invite a less demanding standard of
review than that applicable to the private behavior of others.
Although accepting an intermediate standard of review for purposeful
manipulations of reproductive choice represents a troubling
compromise, 394 this middle ground may offer the most promising

approach available.

394. See note 136 and accompanying text.

